Line maintenance Swiss-módra

Állóhelyen végrehajtott rutinellenőrzések a Swiss International Air Lines HB-JHC lajstromjelű A330-asán..

Multi-modal Digital Avionics for Commercial Applications

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Avionics bay vulnerability?

As the aviation industry secures itself by ensuring passenger personal electronic devices are charged and rerouting flights around war zones, a vulnerability lurks just beneath the carpet of the venerable Boeing 777, and has attracted attention on aviation forums and social media.

In the forward galley area near the L1 door and flight deck, a small access panel sits below the carpet which acts as the gateway to the 777’s electronics and engineering bay. The bay, referred to as the ‘E/E bay’, contains many of the 777’s extremely sensitive systems. A recently posted YouTube video, below, shows how shockingly easy it is to access the E/E bay, and how seemingly little has been done to keep people out.

The systems in the E/E bay vary from fuse panels to the Airplane Information Management System (AIMS), also known as “the brains” of the aircraft. AIMS provides flight and maintenance crews all pertinent information concerning the overall condition of the airplane, its maintenance requirements and its key operating functions, including flight, thrust and communications management, according to Boeing’s description. Also in the E/E bay are several tanks containing oxygen connected to the flight crews’ masks.

Needless to say, any flight would be extremely vulnerable if a passenger were to access this bay in-flight. The vulnerability seems to exist on some Boeing 777s, 767s and 747s, as other models (including those manufactured by Airbus) have either a locked access panel, or the panel is located inside the flight deck.

A late 2013 post on pprune.org (Professional Pilots Rumor Network) notes that the E/E hatch on the Boeing 787 requires a special tool to open, but that this security feature had not trickled down to the 777 at that time. Additionally, it noted that some airlines have bolted the E/E hatch shut not because of security concerns, but due to incidents where employees would fall down the hatch when someone else was inside doing maintenance. Indeed, Boeing published this article on how crew can avoid falls through proper and consistent use of hatch barriers.

Earlier this month the popular Crikey blog suggested that the technical media “has been at pains not to discuss” an alternative access route to the cockpit for years. But Air New Zealand confirmed the security flaw in the 777, said Crikey, after news surfaced that one of its captains locked a co-pilot out of the cockpit for several minutes. A 2012 video about the 777 E/E bay notes that the breakers for the flight deck door locking system are located in the E/E bay.

Whether a lack of directive to secure the E/E bay from passenger access may be due to cost or lack of concern, it seems odd that such a public vulnerability is allowed to exist on such a popular aircraft. Will industry address this issue now? Boeing declined to comment. The FAA did not comment.

This video shows a tour of a Boeing 777’s avionics bay. It’s particularly fascinating in that it shows how you can descend from the main cabin to the lower level through a hatch, and from there make your way to the forward cargo hold or to the outside, through a hatch close to the nose landing gear...

This is a similar video for the Airbus A330 where they actually walk from the avionics bay to the forward cargo hold...


Source:
https://aviationnotes.wordpress.com/2014/11/
https://www.runwaygirlnetwork.com/2014/07/22/will-industry-address-vulnerability-beneath-the-carpet-of-the-777/

AF 358 - final report

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AF 358 aka the "Toronto Miracle"

Completely burnt out - photo taken the other day

Air France Flight 358 was an Airbus A340-313E, registration F-GLZQ, on a scheduled international flight from Paris, France, to Toronto, Ontario, Canada. On August 2, 2005, just after landing at Toronto Pearson International Airport at 4:01 p.m. EDT, it crashed into nearby Etobicoke Creek, approximately 300 m beyond the end of the runway. All 309 passengers and crew aboard the Airbus A340 survived, with 12 people sustaining serious injuries. The accident highlighted the role played by highly trained flight attendants during an emergency.

Aircraft

The aircraft operating Flight 358 was a 295-seat Airbus A340-313E powered by four CFM International CFM56 engines. With manufacturer's serial number 289 and registration F-GLZQ, it was first flown on August 3, 1999, and delivered to Air France on September 7, 1999. There were 297 passengers and 12 crew aboard the Airbus. On this flight, it was flown by Captain Alain Rosaye, 57, and First Officer Frédéric Naud, 43. Rosaye was a seasoned pilot with 15,411 total flight hours and Naud had 4,834 hours of flight time.

Passengers

Out of the 297 passengers, there were 168 adult males, 118 adult females, 8 children and 3 infants. Among them, 3 supplemental cabin crew members were seated in crew seats, one of them in the third occupant seat of the flight deck and two in the flight crew rest area. The passengers consisted of businesspersons, vacationers and students.

Incident

The accident occurred on August 2, 2005 at 16:03 EDT. Air France Flight 358, an Airbus A340-313E with 297 passengers and 12 crew, overshot the end of runway 24L at Toronto Pearson International Airport and came to rest in a small ravine 300 m past the end of the runway. All passengers and crew evacuated the aircraft successfully. Twelve major injuries and no fatalities resulted from the accident. The rest suffered minor or no injuries. A post-crash fire destroyed the aircraft.

The flight landed during exceptionally bad weather – severe winds, heavy rain, and localized thunderstorms near the airport – and touched down further along the runway than usual. Some passengers report that the plane was rocking from side to side before landing, possibly due to turbulence and gusting winds associated with the storm systems.

The plane was cleared to land at 16:04 EDT on Runway 24L, which, at 2,700 m in length, is the shortest runway at Pearson Airport. After touchdown, the aircraft did not stop before the end of the runway, but continued for 300 meters until it slid into the Etobicoke Creek ravine with a speed of 148 km/h, on the western edge of the airport near the interchange of Dixie Road and Highway 401.

Passenger photo taken during the evacuation

After coming to rest, fire was noticed outside the aircraft, and an evacuation order was given. The two rear left exits remained closed due to the fire. On opening the emergency exits, one of the right middle exit slides (R3) deflated after being punctured by debris from the aircraft, while one of the left slides (L2) failed to deploy at all. A number of passengers were forced to jump from the aircraft to exit. The actions of the flight attendants ensured that all of the passengers were evacuated within the required 90 second time frame.

Emergency response teams responded to the incident and were on site within 52 seconds of the crash occurring.

After the crash, some passengers - including those who were injured - scrambled up the ravine to Highway 401 which runs almost parallel to the runway. Peel Regional Police located the first officer and several passengers along Highway 401, receiving assistance from motorists who were passing the airport when the crash occurred. Some motorists took injured people, including the pilot, directly to hospitals. Other motorists took non-injured passengers to the airport. The main fire burned for two hours, ending just before 18:00 EDT. All fires were out by early afternoon on 3 August 2005, and investigators were able to begin their work.

The accident caused the cancellation or diversion of hundreds of flights, with ripple effects throughout the North American air traffic system. By that night, four of the five runway surfaces at Pearson were back in service, but the flight and passenger backlog continued through the next day.

This was the first time an Airbus A340 series was involved in a crash, ending its 14-year clean record. The aircraft involved entered service in 1999 and had its last maintenance check in France on 5 July 2005. It made 3,711 flights for a total of 28,426 flight hours.

Weather

A METAR for Pearson was released almost exactly at the time of the accident. It stated that the weather at 16:04 EDT consisted of winds from 340° true at 24 kn gusting to 33 kn, with 1 1⁄4 miles visibility in heavy thunderstorms and rain. The ceiling was overcast at 4,500 feet above ground level with towering cumulus clouds. The temperature was 23 °C. According to the Canada Air Pilot, runway 24L has a heading of 227° true (237° magnetic), and the minima for the ILS approach are ceiling 200 feet above ground level and visibility 1⁄2 mile or runway visual range (RVR) of 2600.

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reported that the crash occurred two hours after a ground stop was declared at the airport because of severe thunderstorms in the area ("red alert" status, which, for safety reasons, halts all ground activity on the apron and gate area. Aircraft can still land, and take off if still in queue). Visibility at the time of the accident was reported to be very poor. There was lightning, strong gusty winds, and hail at the time and the rain just began as the plane was landing. Within two hours the winds increased from 5 to 30 km/h and the temperature dropped from 30 to 23 °C. A severe thunderstorm warning was in effect since 11:30 a.m. and all outbound flights and ground servicing operations had been canceled but landings were still permitted.

Injuries

Out of the twelve passengers who suffered major injuries, nine suffered the injuries from the impact and three suffered the injuries from the evacuation. Most of the injuries occurred to passengers and crew located in the flight deck and forward cabin.

According to passenger reports, the leap from the aircraft to the ground caused many of the injuries, including broken legs, and ruptured vertebrae. The Captain sustained back and head injuries during the impact of the crash when his seat was wrenched out of place by the force of the impact, causing him to hit his head against the overhead controls. Minor injuries included twisted ankles, sore necks, bruises and effects from smoke inhalation. A total of 33 persons were taken to various hospitals within and outside Toronto for treatment, of which 21 were treated for minor injuries and released.

Investigation

Evidence

Too far down the runway...

The flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were sent to France for analysis. Preliminary results indicate that the plane landed 1,220 m from the start of the 2,743 m runway (much further along than normal) at a ground speed of 148 knots – 140 knots being considered normal – with a tailwind, skidded down the runway and was traveling over 70 knots as it overran the tarmac and fell into the ravine. Tire marks extend 490 m indicating emergency braking action.

Réal Levasseur Shedalin, the TSB's lead investigator for the accident, said the plane landed too far down the runway to have been able to stop properly on such wet pavement. Investigators have found no evidence of engine trouble, brake failure, or problems with the spoilers or thrust reversers.

Ireggularities

The final report of the TSB investigation states: "During the flare, the aircraft travelled through an area of heavy rain, and visual contact with the runway environment was significantly reduced." This suggests the possibility that the plane was hit in heavy weather by a wet downburst, causing the Airbus to land long. Based on the Air France A340-313 Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), page 34G, "Landing Distance Without Autobrake", the minimum distance of 1,155 m would be used in dry conditions to bring the aircraft to a complete stop. In wet conditions the braking distance increases with a 5-knot tailwind, reversers operative, and a 6.3 mm of downpour on the runway to 2,016 m. This runway length was obviously not available at touch down of AF 358.

Conclusions

The TSB concluded in their final report that the pilots had missed cues that would have prompted them to review their decision to land. In their report the TSB cited that

• Air France had no procedures related to distance required from thunderstorms during approaches and landings.
• After the autopilot had been disengaged, the pilot flying increased engine thrust in reaction to a decrease in airspeed and a perception that the aircraft was sinking (spatial disorientation). The power increase contributed to an increase in aircraft energy and the aircraft deviated above the flight path.
• At 300 feet above ground level, the wind changed from a headwind to a tailwind.
• While approaching the threshold, the aircraft entered an intense downpour and the forward visibility became severely reduced.
• When the aircraft was near the threshold, the crew members committed to the landing and believed their go-around option no longer existed.
• The pilot not flying did not make the standard callouts concerning the spoilers and thrust reversers during the landing roll. This contributed to the delay in the pilot flying selecting the thrust reversers.
• There were no landing distances indicated on the operational flight plan for a contaminated runway condition at the Toronto / Lester B. Pearson International Airport.
• The crew did not calculate the landing distance required for runway 24L despite aviation routine weather reports (METARs) calling for thunderstorms. The crew were not aware of the margin of error.
• The topography at the end of the runway beyond the area and the end of Runway 24L contributed to aircraft damage and injuries to crew and passengers.

The TSB advised changes to bring Canadian runway standards in line with those used abroad, either by extending them to have a 300 m runway safety area (or Runway End Safety Area) or, where that is impossible, providing an equivalently effective backup method of stopping aircraft. Other recommendations that the TSB made includes having the Department of Transport establish clear standards limiting approaches and landings in convective weather for all operators at Canadian airports, and mandate training for all pilots involved in Canadian air operations to better enable them to make landing decisions in bad weather.

Compensation

Within one week of the crash, cash payments ranging from C$1,000 to C$3,700 were given to passengers for interim emergency use. These funds were given to passengers through an emergency centre set up near the airport. These payments were independent of the claims process, which has been started for passengers who have not retained counsel. It is expected that the insurers of Air France will pay for all damages as well as extra compensation for having passengers go through the ordeal; however, only amounts of €6,000 to €9,000 have been offered, prompting passengers to turn to the lawsuit to seek legal action. All passengers have also been offered a free round-trip ticket to any Air France destination in the world in the same fare class in which they were originally booked on AF358.

After a lawsuit lasting four and a half years, Air France settled the compensation lawsuit with 184 of the 297 passengers (no crew members included) aboard Flight 358. The compensation is for a total of $12 million. Air France will pay $10 million, and have been released from passengers' claims stemming from the incident, according to the judgment's summary. Airbus and Goodrich, the company that made the emergency evacuation system on the plane will pay $1.65 million, and claims against them in a lawsuit have been released.

Litigation

Passenger class action

Within a few days after the accident, a class action suit was filed on behalf of all passengers on board by representative plaintiff Suzanne Deak to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The attorneys representing Deak and the passengers are Gary R. Will and Paul Miller from Will Barristers in Toronto. The plaintiffs sought payments for general and aggravated damages in the amount of $75 million, and payments for special damages and pecuniary damages in the amount of $250 million. A second class action lawsuit was also filed by plaintiffs Sahar Alqudsi and Younis Qawasmi (her husband) for $150 million a few days later. However, both suits had since merged as only one lawsuit was allowed to proceed to court.

In December 2009, a $12 million settlement agreement was reached between Air France and the class. The settlement resolved the claims of 184 passengers and their families. Forty-five other passengers had opted out of the suit, while 68 others have already agreed to a settlement with Air France.

Air France stated that it would not lose any money from the lawsuits as it is covered by its insurers. Air France did not provide further contacts and assistance to those who retained counsel of the lawsuit until an agreement has been made between both sides' lawyers.

Air France lawsuit

R(E)SA could have prevented this to happen..?

In June 2008, almost 3 years after the accident, Air France filed a lawsuit against the Greater Toronto Airports Authority, NAV Canada, and the Government of Canada for $180 million. In the statement of claim filed with the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Air France alleged that the "GTAA failed to provide a safe environment for the conduct of civil air operations." The statement also claims that "The overrun and the consequent injuries to persons and damage to property were caused solely by the negligence of the defendants". Air France says Transport Canada was "negligent" by not implementing the recommendations of a coroner's inquest into the 1978 crash (Air Canada Flight 189) that urged the creation of a 300-metre safety area to give aircraft more room to stop after landing.

Aftermath

An inquiry by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada found runway safety zones at the end of runways at some Canadian airports are below accepted international standards. The report highlighted that Toronto Pearson's runways meet current Canadian standards, and that runway 24L has a de facto 150 metre RESA. The TSB also suggested precautions are needed to be taken by airlines when landing in bad weather.

Flight 358 is no longer used on this route (number is now used for Air France flights from Roland Garros Airport in Sainte-Marie, Réunion to Paris). The flight route designation for Air France's Paris-Toronto route is now Flight 356, using a Boeing 777 aircraft.

Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_358

Fedex 705

FX 705

On April 7, 1994, Federal Express Flight 705, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 cargo jet carrying electronics across the United States from Memphis, Tennessee to San Jose, California, experienced an attempted hijacking for the purpose of a suicide attempt.

Auburn Calloway, a Federal Express employee facing possible dismissal for lying about his reported flight hours, boarded the scheduled flight as a deadheading passenger with a guitar case carrying several hammers and a speargun. He intended to disable the aircraft's cockpit voice recorder before take-off and, once airborne, kill the crew with hammers so their injuries would appear consistent with an accident rather than a hijacking. The speargun would be a last resort. He would then crash the aircraft while just appearing to be an employee killed in an accident. This would make his family eligible for a $2.5 million life insurance policy paid by Federal Express.

Calloway's plan was unsuccessful. Despite severe injuries, the crew was able to fight back, subdue Calloway and land the aircraft safely. An attempt at a mental health defense was unsuccessful and Calloway was subsequently convicted of multiple charges including attempted murder, attempted air piracy and interference with flight crew operations. He received two consecutive life sentences. Calloway's appeal was successful in having his conviction for interference ruled as a lesser included offense of attempted air piracy.

Hijacker

The 42-year-old Federal Express flight engineer Auburn Calloway, an alumnus of Stanford University, a former Navy pilot and martial arts expert, faced termination of employment over irregularities in the reporting of flight hours. In order to disguise the hijacking as an accident so his family would benefit from his $2.5 million life insurance policy, Calloway intended to murder the flight crew using blunt force. To accomplish this, he brought aboard two claw hammers, two sledge hammers and a speargun concealed inside a guitar case. It is unclear how Calloway planned to crash the plane or dispose of his intended murder weapons. Just before the flight, Calloway had transferred over $54,000 in securities and cashier's checks to his ex-wife. He also carried a note aboard, written to her and "describing the author's apparent despair".

Flight details

Initially, Calloway was the flight engineer on this flight, but he and his crew exceeded the maximum flying hours by one minute the previous day, so the new three-man flight crew consisted of 49-year-old Captain David Sanders, 42-year-old First Officer James Tucker, and 39-year-old flight engineer Andrew Peterson. At the time of the incident, First Officer James Tucker held the position of Captain at Federal Express on the DC-10 and was also a check airman on the type. Aboard Flight 705, Tucker assumed the role of first officer. FedEx Flight 705 was scheduled to fly to San Jose, California with electronic equipment destined for Silicon Valley.

Hijacking

As part of his plan to disguise the intended attack as an accident, Calloway attempted to disable the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) by tripping its circuit breaker. During standard pre-flight checks, Peterson noticed the tripped breaker and reset it before take-off so the CVR was reactivated. However, if Calloway successfully killed the crew members with the CVR still on, he would simply have to fly for 30 minutes to erase any trace of a struggle from the CVR's 30 minute loop. About twenty minutes after takeoff, as the flight crew carried on a casual conversation, Calloway entered the flight deck and commenced his attack. Every member of the crew took multiple hammer blows which fractured both Peterson's and Tucker's skulls, severing Peterson's temporal artery. The blow to Tucker's head initially rendered him unable to move or react but he was still conscious. Sanders reported that during the beginning of the attack, he could not discern any emotion from Calloway, just "simply a face in his eyes". When Calloway ceased his attack with hammers, Peterson and Sanders began to get out of their seats to counter-attack. Calloway left the cockpit and retrieved his spear gun. He came back into the cockpit and threatened everyone to sit back down in their seats. Despite loud ringing in his ear and being dazed, Peterson grabbed the gun by the spear between the barbs and the barrel. A lengthy struggle ensued with the flight engineer and captain as Tucker, also an ex-Navy pilot, performed extreme aerial maneuvers with the aircraft.

The aircraft involved in FedEx's 90's paint scheme

Tucker pulled the plane into a sudden 15 degree climb, throwing Sanders, Peterson and Calloway out of the cockpit and into the galley. To try to throw Calloway off balance, Tucker then turned the plane into a left roll, almost on its side. This rolled the combatants along the smoke curtain onto the left side of the galley. Eventually, Tucker had rolled the plane onto its back at 140 degrees, while attempting to maintain a visual reference of the environment around him through the windows. Peterson, Sanders and Calloway were then pinned to the ceiling of the plane. Calloway managed to reach his hammer hand free and hit Sanders in the head again. Just then, Tucker put the plane into a steep dive. This pushed the combatants back to the seat curtain, but the wings and elevators started to flutter. At this point Tucker could hear the wind rushing against the cockpit windows. At 530 mph, the elevators on the plane became unresponsive due to the disrupted airflow. Tucker realized this was because the throttles were at full power. Releasing his only usable hand to pull back the throttles to idle, he managed to pull the plane out of the dive while it slowed down.

Calloway managed to hit Sanders again while the struggle continued. Sanders was losing strength and Peterson was heavily bleeding from a ruptured artery. Sanders managed to grab the hammer out of Calloway's hand and attacked him with it. When the plane was completely level, Tucker reported to Memphis Center, informed them about the attack and requested a vector back to Memphis. He requested an ambulance and "armed intervention", meaning he wanted SWAT to storm the plane. When Tucker began to hear the fight increase in the galley, he put the aircraft into a right turn then back to the left.

The flight crew eventually succeeded in restraining Calloway, though only after moments of inverted and near-transonic flight beyond the designed capabilities of a DC-10. Sanders took control and Tucker, who had by then lost use of the right side of his body, went back to assist Peterson in restraining Calloway. Sanders communicated with air traffic control, preparing for an emergency landing back at Memphis International Airport. Meanwhile, after screaming that he could not breathe, Calloway started fighting with the crew again.

Heavily loaded with fuel and cargo, the plane was approaching too fast and too high to land on the scheduled runway 9. Sanders requested by radio to land on the longer runway 36 left. Ignoring warning messages from the onboard computer and using a series of sharp turns that tested the DC-10's safety limits, Sanders landed the jet safely on the runway at well over its maximum designed landing weight. By that time, Calloway was once again restrained. Emergency personnel gained access to the plane via escape slide and ladder. Inside, they found the cockpit interior covered in blood.

Aftermath

Crew reunion recalling the "bloody" flight of FedEx

The crew of Flight 705 sustained serious injuries. The left side of Tucker's skull was severely fractured, causing motor control problems in his right arm and right leg. Calloway had also dislocated Tucker's jaw, attempted to gouge out one of his eyes and stabbed his right arm. Sanders suffered several deep gashes in his head and doctors had to sew his right ear back in place. Flight engineer Peterson's skull was fractured and his temporal artery severed. The aircraft itself incurred damages in the amount of $800,000 ($1,277,234 when adjusted for inflation).

Calloway pleaded temporary insanity but was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences on August 15, 1995, for attempted murder and attempted air piracy.

On May 26, 1994, the Air Line Pilots Association awarded Dave Sanders, James Tucker and Andrew Peterson the Gold Medal Award for heroism, the highest award a civilian pilot can receive. Due to the extent and severity of their injuries, none of the crew has, so far, been recertified as medically fit to fly commercially.

Although medically unfit to return to commercial aviation, James Tucker returned to recreational flying in his Luscombe 8A.

As of 2015, the McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 aircraft involved, N306FE, remains in service as an upgraded MD-10 without the flight engineer position, though it is expected to be phased out by 2018.

Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Express_Flight_705

RA 36801 - final report

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Magassági rekorder: La Paz 'El Alto'

Leszállás a világ legmagasabban (4061,5 m) fekvő nemzetközi repülőterére az Aerosur 727-esével...
...ill. távozás a TAB Cargo DC-10-esével: