PA 845

Pan Am Flight 845 was a Boeing 747-121, registration N747PA, operating as a scheduled international passenger flight between Los Angeles, CA and Tokyo, with an intermediate stop at San Francisco International Airport (SFO/KSFO). On July 30, 1971, at 15:29 PDT, while taking off from San Francisco bound for Tokyo, the aircraft struck approach lighting system structures located past the end of the runway, seriously injuring two passengers and sustaining significant damage. The crew continued the takeoff, flying out over the ocean and circling while dumping fuel, eventually returning for a landing in San Francisco. After coming to a stop, the crew ordered an emergency evacuation, during which 27 passengers were injured while exiting the aircraft, with eight of them suffering serious back injuries. The accident was investigated by the NTSB, which determined the probable cause was the pilot's use of incorrect takeoff reference speeds. The NTSB also found various procedural failures in the dissemination and retrieval of flight safety information, which contributed to the accident.

Aircraft and crew

In good shape again some time after 1975

The Boeing 747-121, registration N747PA, manufacturing serial number 19639, first flew on April 11, 1969 and was delivered to Pan Am on October 3, 1970. She was the third 747 off Boeing's production line but wasn't delivered until nearly ten months after Pan Am's first 747 flight. Originally named Clipper America it had logged 2,900 hours of operation at the time of the accident.

The flight crew of Flight 845 consisted of five Crew (a captain, a first officer, a flight engineer, a relief flight engineer and a relief pilot). The captain was Calvin Y. Dyer, a 57-year old resident of Redwood City, California, a pilot with 27,209 hours flying experience, 868 of which were on the 747. The first officer was Paul E. Oakes, a 41-year old resident of Reno Nevada, with 10,568 hours experience, 595 on the 747. The flight engineer was Winfree Horne, he was 57-years old and from Los Altos, California, he had 23,569 hours flight experience, 168 on the 747. Second officer Wayne E. Sagar was the relief pilot he had 3,230 hours of flight experience, 456 on the 747. The relief flight engineer was Roderic E. Proctor, a 57-year old resident of Palo Alto, California, he had 24,576 flight hours, 236 on the 747.

On July 29 1971, Dyer, Oakes, Horne, Sagar and Proctor had spent the whole day off-duty. They had also flown the initial Los Angeles to San Francisco leg of the flight.

Accident history

Robust approach lighting system along the end of RWY 01R

Flight 845's crew had planned and calculated their takeoff for runway 28L, but discovered only after pushback that this runway had been closed hours earlier for maintenance, and that the first 1,000 feet (300 m) of runway 01R, the preferential runway at that time, had also been closed. After consulting with Pan Am flight controllers and the control tower, the crew decided to take off from runway 01R, shorter compared to 28L, with less favorable wind conditions.

Runway 01R was about 8,500 feet (2,600 m) long from its displaced threshold (from which point the takeoff was to start) to the end, which was the available takeoff length for Flight 845. Because of various misunderstandings, the flight crew was erroneously informed the available takeoff length from the displaced threshold was 9,500 feet (2,900 m), a thousand feet longer than actually existed. Despite the shorter length, it was later determined that the aircraft could have taken off safely, had the proper procedures been followed.

As the crew prepared for takeoff on the shorter runway, they selected 20 degrees of flaps instead of their originally planned 10 degree setting, but did not recalculate their takeoff reference speeds (V1, Vr and V2), which had been calculated for the lower flap setting, and were thus too high for their actual takeoff configuration. Consequently these critical speeds were called late and the aircraft's takeoff roll was abnormally prolonged. In fact the first officer called Vr at 160 knots (300 km/h) instead of the planned 164 knots (304 km/h) because the end of the runway was "coming up at a very rapid speed."

Damage

Severe but economically repairable damage

Unable to attain sufficient altitude to clear obstructions at the end of the runway, the aircraft's aft fuselage, landing gear and other structures were damaged as it struck components of the approach lighting system (ALS) at over 160 knots (300 km/h). Three lengths of angle iron up to 17 ft long (5.2 m) penetrated the cabin, injuring two passengers. The right main under-body landing gear was forced up and into the fuselage, and the left under-body landing gear was ripped loose and remained dangling beneath the aircraft. Other systems damaged in the impact included Nos 1, 3 and 4 hydraulic systems, several wing and empennage control surfaces and their mechanisms, electrical systems including the antiskid control, and three of the evacuation slides.

The flight proceeded out over the Pacific Ocean for 1 hour and 42 minutes to dump fuel in order to reduce weight for an emergency landing. During this time, damage to the aircraft was assessed and the injured treated by doctors on the passenger list. After dumping fuel, the aircraft returned to the airport. Emergency services were deployed and the plane landed on runway 28R. During landing, six tires on the under-wing landing gear failed. Reverse thrust functioned only on engine 4, so the aircraft slowly veered to the right, off the runway and came to a stop. There was no fire, though a film taken of the landing showed brief flames from the area of the left under-wing landing gear. After stopping, the aircraft slowly tilted backwards due to the missing body gear, which had been ripped off or disabled on takeoff. The aircraft came to rest on its tail with its nose elevated. Until this accident it was not known that the 747 would tilt backwards without the support of the main body gear.

Injuries

There were no fatalities among the 218 passengers and crew aboard, but two passengers were seriously injured during the impact, and during the subsequent emergency evacuation twenty-seven more sustained injuries, eight of them serious.

Rods of angle iron from the ALS structure penetrated the passenger compartment, injuring passengers in seats 47G (near amputation of left leg below the knee) and 48G (severe laceration and crushing of left upper arm).

After landing, the aircraft veered off the runway on its damaged landing gear and came to a halt. Evacuation commenced from the front due to a failure to broadcast the evacuation order over the cabin address system (it was erroneously broadcast over the radio), the order being given by one of the flight crew exiting the cockpit and noticing that evacuation had not commenced. During this time, the aircraft settled aft, resting on its tail in a nose-up attitude. The four forward slides were unsafe for use due to the greater elevation and high winds. Most passengers evacuated from the rear six slides. Eight passengers using the forward slides sustained serious back injuries and were hospitalised. Other passengers suffered minor injuries such as abrasions and sprains.

Investigation

The accident was investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which issued its final report on May 24, 1972. According to the NTSB, the Probable Cause of the accident was:

...the pilot’s use of incorrect takeoff reference speeds. This resulted from a series of irregularities involving: (1) the collection and dissemination of airport information; (2) aircraft dispatching; and (3) crew management and discipline; which collectively rendered ineffective the air carrier’s operational control system.

Aftermath

Last stage: serving as a restaurant in South-Korea

Subsequent to the accident, the aircraft was repaired and returned to service. N747PA was re-registered and leased to Air Zaire as N747QC from 1973 until March 1975, when returned to Pan Am, where it was renamed Clipper Sea Lark, and then Clipper Juan T. Trippe in honor of the airline's founder. It remained with Pan Am until the airline ceased operations in 1991, and was transferred to Aeroposta, then briefly to Kabo Air of Nigeria, back to Aeroposta, and was finally cut into pieces in 1999 in San Bernardino, California. The parts of the aircraft were shipped to Hopyeong, Namyangju, South Korea and reassembled, to serve as a restaurant for some time, until it closed down. The aircraft was finally scrapped in 2010.

Source:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_Am_Flight_845

Destroy to protect - tests show how to prevent another Lockerbie

Early summer haze hangs over a little-known airfield in the English midlands. In the midday stillness a small gathering waits, gazes and fixes lenses intently on a white Boeing 747 about 400m (1,300ft) away across the grass. Suddenly, the aircraft shudders and, just as the soundwave from the destructive explosion reaches the crowd, the massive fuselage bursts open, ejecting debris, then crumples and sags. Silence falls as the dust descends around the broken hull.

The surreal aura is enhanced when a scientist declares the experiment a success. It is the climax of a research programme to enable aircraft to survive terrorist bombs, and this scene of devastation is, he says, what his research team had been expecting. Meanwhile, there is a car parked near the airfield gathering, and stickers in its windows pronounce: "Lockerbie. Let the truth be known."

If technology tested on that May day had been applied to the Pan American Boeing 747 blown up by a terrorist bomb over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988 killing the 259 people on board, the aircraft might well have landed safely, according to initial assessments of this explosive experiment. The 17 May test, carried out at Bruntingthorpe airfield, involved the detonation of four explosive charges simultaneously inside a fully pressurised 747-100. Three of the charges caused negligible damage, according to the testing agencies. Almost all the havoc was wrought by the one charge which was in a standard baggage container, like the Lockerbie bomb.

The scientists' initial reaction is that even an airborne 747 would probably have survived the "bombs" placed in all but the unprotected container, but full analysis of the test is not expected to be complete until mid June. The UK Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA), contracted to conduct the experimental work for the Civil Aviation Authority, says that the test went perfectly.

The four separate explosive charges were used to test the effectiveness of four different levels of blast-protection. The need to detonate them simultaneously was driven by cost considerations. Another hull, which the DERA describes only as "a wide-bodied European aircraft", was blown up at Shoeburyness, UK, in September 1995 as part of the same four-year research programme, and resources were only sufficient to buy one 747. To have set off charges separately would, after the first explosion, have meant that the 747 hull could not have been pressurised for the others. From the earlier tests, the DERA's chief materials scientist Prof Chris Peel and his team have created computer models of various tapes of explosions and their effects.

On 17 May, the 747 was pressurised to 0.62 bar (91b/in2) to simulate the differential pressure expected at more than 35,000ft. The "bombs" were placed in four containers. Container No 1 was "hardened", produced by the US Federal Aviation Administration as a part of its contribution to this international programme. The FAA declines to give details of the materials used, just as DERA will not give details of the explosive materials or quantities used, for security reasons. No 2 was a standard container next to a cargo-hold wall which was covered by a flexible Kevlar-fibre protective lining; the third was a standard container with a 200mm-thick lining; No 4 was a standard luggage container.

The 747's cargo holds were loaded also with other containers packed with rags to simulate the reality of a normal aircraft with luggage and cargo on board. Peel says that the future holds several options as to how to use the newly gained knowledge. These include modifying the design of new-build aircraft hulls, using blast-attenuating containers and having protective lining for cargo holds. All these would add to the aircraft weight, the DERA says, commenting that the hold-lining would add about 3t to a 747 using present materials.

This experiment is a test for theories developed over four years of research, and it allows adjustments to be made to a software model which will prove invaluable for further work. Finally, there is a feeling that the loop has been closed: the aircraft type which suffered the disaster giving rise to this research has been put to the test, but this time with some help.

David Learmount

Source:
Flight International, 28th May - 3rd June 1997

[Vintage] Az első B747 Zürichben

Az első B747-es leszállása Zürich-Klotenben a TWA színeiben 1970-ben...

[First flight] B747

1969. február 9.


Még egy videó az everetti Boeing-gyár építésétől a B747-es szűzfelszállásáig:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aHbpTahG7x4

Evergreen Supertanker

[Tudtad-e?]

Boeing 747-es először 1985-ben szállt le a 13L/31R pályára, de megfordult már rajta Concorde ill. An-225 Mrija is...

PA 103

A Pan Am 103-as járata a Pan American World Airways harmadik menetrend szerinti transzatlanti járata volt London Heathrow és New York JFK repülőtere között. 1988. december 21-én az ezen az útvonalon repülő N739PA lajstromjelű, "Clipper Maid of the Seas" névre keresztelt Boeing 747-121 megsemmisült, roncsai a skóciai Lockerbie kisvárosára zuhantak. A katasztrófát követő nyomozás során kiderült, hogy a gép első rakterében egy 350-450 gramm közötti tömegű plasztikbomba robbant. A robbanás a gép szinte azonnali megsemmisüléséhez vezetett. A 130–190 km/h sebességű szél a roncsokat mintegy 130 km hosszan, 2189 km² területen szórta szét. A katasztrófának 21 országból összesen 270 áldozata volt, közülük 4 magyar.

A PA103-as járat PA103A-járatjént indult a frankfurti nemzetközi repülőtérről. A Frankfurt és London közötti részen az utasokat egy Boeing 727-es szállította. A PA103A 89 utasából 47-en továbbszálltak a Boeing 747-esre, amely már mint PA103-as járat indult tovább a New York-i JFK repülőtérre. A 747-es délben érkezett San Franciscóból. A menetrend szerint a gépnek 18:00 órakor kellett volna elindulnia, ám a csúcsidős zsúfoltság miatt a gép csak 18:25-kor szállt fel a 27L kifutópályáról. A repülőteret északnyugati irányban hagyta el, az úgynevezett Daventry-indulás szerint. A heathrowi közelkörzet elhagyása után a kapitány a gépet északi irányba, Skócia felé fordította. 18:56-kor a gép közeledett az angol-skót határhoz és elérte az FL310-es utazómagasságot. MacQuarrie kapitány a hajtóművek tolóerejét visszavette utazó állásra.

19:00-kor a PA103 megjelent a prestwicki skót útvonalirányítás radarján, ahonnan az Atlanti-óceán átrepüléséhez szükséges engedélyt kérik a gépek. A légiirányító radarképernyőjén a gép egy kis doboznak látszott, közepén egy apró kereszttel, amelyhez egy vonallal kapcsolódott a gép transzponderkódja. Alan Topp légiirányító vette fel a kapcsolatot a Clipper Maid of the Seas-zel, miután az belépett a skót légtérbe. James MacQuarrie kapitány válaszolt: „Jó estét Scottish, itt Clipper egy három nulla. Magasságunk három egy nulla.” Majd Wagner másodpilóta beszélt: „Clipper 103 óceánrepülési engedélyt kér.” Ezek voltak a gépről elhangzott utolsó szavak. Ebben a pillanatban a gép kódja és a doboz közepéről a kereszt eltűnt. Topp megpróbálta felvenni a kapcsolatot MacQuarrie kapitánnyal, és egy közeli KLM járattól is ugyanezt kérte, de választ nem kapott. Először Topp azt hitte, hogy a gép egy radarárnyék-zónába repült be. Ahol egy zöld doboznak kellett volna a radaron látszania, ott négy jelent meg, majd egy pár másodperc múlva ezek elkezdtek egymástól távolodni.

Egy perccel később egy 91t üzemanyagot tartalmazó szárnydarab Lockerbie skót kisváros Sherwood Crescent utcájában a földhöz csapódott tizenegy lakost megölve. A detonáció egy 47 méter átmérőjű, 560 köbméteres krátert hozott létre, több házat az alapjával együtt porig rombolt és 21 további épületet annyira megrongált, hogy azokat le kellett bontani. A házak fölé tűzgolyó emelkedett és a közeli A74-es Glasgow-Carlisle autópálya felé tartott, ahol a déli irányba tartó sávokban autókat perzselt meg. Robin Chamberlain, a British Airways pilótája a Glasgow-London útvonalon repülve, nem messze Carlisle-tól rádión jelentette a skót útvonalirányításnak, hogy egy hatalmas tüzet lát a földön. A PA103 pusztulása Topp képernyőjén tovább folytatódott: most már rengeteg kis zöld doboz sodródott kelet felé a széllel.

A repülési adatrögzítőt a rendőrség a bombamerénylet után 24 órán belül fellelte. A balesetet vizsgáló szakemberek arra a következtetésre jutottak, hogy a robbanás ereje kirántotta helyükről a 747-es idegrendszeri központját alkotó navigációs és kommunikációs berendezések kábeleit. Ennek következtében a géptörzs eleje legyezni, forogni és bólintani kezdett. Ezen erőteljes, minden irányba ható mozgások miatt elszakadt az az erősítő fémöv, amely a gép orrát rögzítette a géptest bal oldali ablaksorához, és az orr-rész elkezdett leszakadni. A keletkező lökéshullámok a légkondicionáló csöveken át végighaladtak a géptesten, és kettészakították. A robbanási pont felett több méterrel a 747-es plafonja lehámlott a gépről. A robbanás erejét tovább növelte a gép belseje és külseje közötti légnyomás-különbség. A gépen belül túlnyomás uralkodott, míg kívül a légnyomás a tengerszintinek csupán egynegyede volt. A pilótafülkét és az elsőosztályú üléseket tartalmazó orr-rész letört a géptestről, és zuhanás közben nekiütközött a 3-as számú hajtóműnek, amely emiatt szintén levált a gépről. A nyomozók szerint a robbanás utáni három másodpercen belül az orr-rész, a géptörzs és a 3-as hajtómű már külön zuhant. A géptörzs a 6000 méteres magasság eléréséig előre és lefelé haladt, majd ettől a ponttól kezdve szinte függőlegesen zuhant. Zuhanás közben a géptörzs több kisebb darabra szakadt szét. A szárnyakon maradt részek értek földet először a Sherwood Crescent-en, ahol a szárnyakban tárolt kerozin belobbant.

A gépen utazó 243 utasból és 16 fős személyzetből senki sem élte túl a katasztrófát. Egy skót baleseti vizsgálat megállapította, hogy az orr-rész leszakadásakor tornádó-erejű szél tört be a géptestbe, amely leszakította az utasok ruháit és minden mozdítható tárgyat halálos repeszként sodort hátra a gépben. A le nem rögzített tárgyakat és embereket a tomboló szél kifújta a géptestből a külső, -46 °C-os hidegbe. A 9 km-es zuhanás nagyjából két percig tarthatott. Néhány utas biztonsági öve be volt csatolva, így ők egyenesen a lockerbie-i becsapódásig székükben maradtak.

A katasztrófa helyszínét katonai és civil helikopterekkel, műholdképekkel és centiméterről centiméterre haladó aprólékos kézimunkával mérték fel. Több mint 10 000 darab roncsot és egyéb maradványt találtak, amelyek mindegyikét felcímkézték és egy számítógépes adatbázisba gyűjtötték. A nyomozók a darabokból újra összeállították a repülőgép törzsét és felfedeztek egy 50 cm átmérőjű nyílást, amely egy első poggyásztérben történt robbanásra utalt. A poggyászkonténerek vizsgálatakor kiderült, hogy a nyíláshoz legközelebb álló konténeren elszenesedési, gödrösödési és egyéb károk keletkeztek, arra utalván, hogy a konténeren belül egy „magas energiájú esemény” következett be. Egy sor kísérleti robbantás megerősítette a robbanóanyag pontos helyét és mennyiségét. A nyomozók azt is kiderítették, hogy a PanAm 103-as járatára a járatközi csomagkezelő rendszer segítségével irányították az utas nélküli poggyászt. A csomagot a máltai Luqa repülőtéren adták fel a KM180-as frankfurti járatra, ahonnan a PA103A járat továbbszállította Heathrow-ra. A végzetes bomba ebben a csomagban volt...

Forrás:
http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockerbie-i_katasztr%C3%B3fa