Forgotten airfields: Winter airfield

Winter airfield was an airfield on the island of Fuerteventura, Canary Islands, Spain. Depending on the source, the airfield was built either just before or just after World War II by German entrepreneur Gustav Winter. Mr. Winters history on the island (and his connection to the airfield) makes for interesting reading and it is hard to distinguish fact from fiction.

The legend (with many small variations existing):

In the early 1930s German engineer Gustav Winter settled down in Morro Jable, a small fishing village on the westernmost tip of Fuerteventura. Only weeks before he had settled a lease on the whole peninsula of Jandia with the Spanish government. Mr. Winter, who always wore dark sunglasses accompanied by his black dog, contributed to the development of Morro Jable and Jandia by building a school, a church and a road to the peninsula. He also took the initiative to build Morro Jable its first harbour and planted over 10,000 trees on the Pico del Zarza (none of which survived). 'Don Gustavo' recuited local men to build his villa under strict secrecy rules. Every morning the men were brought to the site and they had to leave by the evening, with the borders being guarded by watchmen. The alliance between Hitler and Franco (Spain's ruler until the 1970s) made it possible to declare a major portion of the Peninsula a restricted military area, evicting the local population. Winter was to carry out important economical projects for the Reich with German workers. In reality these workers were concentration camp prisoners from Tefía. A mysterious cemetery near the beach leaves speculations about the working conditions of these men. Jandia was sold to Dehesa de Jandia S.A. of which Mr Winter was manager. On several places (both near the villa and furter away) railways tracks are visible, so appearantly there was a lot of construction work on the mountainside. There is evidence suggesting Fuerteventura, because of its strategic location, must have been a U-boat base for the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) during World War 2. It is certain that U-boats were in the waters around the Canary Islands, and at least 6 port visits were made by U-boats between March and July 1941. It is likely that the tower of Mr Winters villa served as a waypoint for the U-boats, as well as for German aircraft coming to his airfield on the tip of Jandia.
Many speculations claim that the peninsula had a secret U-boat base in one of the volcanic lavatunnels littered along the coast. Rumour has it that two complete U-boats (still listed as missing in action) are still inside. An Austrian-Spanish team that went looking for the submarine base alledgedly died when their yacht exploded. The tower in the villa alledgedly has a large fusebox, indicating equipment was used that required a lot of electricity. Another rumour tells that near and shortly after the war the Winter Villa was used as a clinic where Nazi criminals received plastic surgery before beginning a new live in South America. Eyewitnesses claimed to have seen U-boats near the coast of Jandia and several aircraft have been said to land and leave at the airfield. Mr Winter died in Las Palmas in 1971 and until the 1990s his villa was protected by a private security firm.
The security firm kept all visitors at a distance.

The real story (according to VillaWinter.com, largely built on Mr Winter's interview with German magazine Stern):

Gustav Winter was born in 1893 in Neustad in the Black Forest in Germany. In 1915 he came to Spain and set up a technical studio in Madrid in 1921. In 1924, aged 28 he founded the CICER electricity plant in Las Palmas, Gran Canaria, which opened in 1928. The first clues to his connections to Jandia appeared in 1933 (the same year Hitler came to power). On 19 July 1937 Winter signed a lease with the heirs of the Conde de Santa Coloma from Lanzarote. Later that same year he travelled to Berlin to find funding for his enterprise. In July and August of 1938 a small Winter-led expedition travelled to Fuerteventura to photograph and chart the peninsula. Winter succeeded to get permission to start economically important projects for the Third Reich in 1938. At the same time he was also present as an agent for the Abwehr (German intellligence agency). From 1939 locals were no longer permitted to enter the Jandia peninsula. In October 1940 Hitler and Franco disagreed over a support facility in the Canary Islands. Franco hesitated because of Spains sovereignity, so for the time being he held Hitler at bay. Between March and July 1941 6 successive port visits were made by German U-Boats in the port of Las Palmas (under code name Culebra) for support by the MV Corrientes, an 'interned' German ship. (in chronologic order: U-124, U-105, U-106, U-123, U-69, U-103). In 1941 a notary passed the sale of Dehesa de Jandia S.A. to three Spaniards. Its general manager was Mr. Gustav Winter. In 1943 the U-167 was shot at by an English patrol aircraft. It's crew managed to bring the boat to the south of Gran Canaria, where it sank. During the war Mr. Winter led a repair facility of the Kriegsmarine in Bordeaux. Mr. Winter met his (soon to be) wife in Madrid in 1945. Construction of the Winter Villa began in 1946. That same year the road to Cofete was constructed by prisoners of the Tefía concentration camp. The Allies allowed the Winter couple to return to the Canary Islands in 1947. Gustav began a tomato palantation, had wells drilled and tried to forest the mountains of Jandia. For several days, locals heard explosions on the peninsula in 1950. Villa Winter was built in its present form from 1950, after the appropriate permits were granted. In an interview with German magazine Stern, Mr. Winter claimed the villa was not completed until the end of 1958. He had been unable to provide Stern magazine with any reasonable explanation for his airfield though. In 1962 the Dehesa de Jandia S.A. transferred the 2,300hectares of land between Morro Jable and Cofete to Gustav Winter, thanking him for the development of the peninsula. In 1971 Mr. Winter died, and Stern Magazine published their story on him. Amongst others the article claimed that German Film Producer Hans Wernicke, who had lived on Gran Canaria for years, discovered closets filled with Wehrmacht uniforms during a secret visit to the by then already abandoned villa (source). Mr. Winter's heirs had the villa renovated in 1985, closing the entrances to the cellars under the villa. The villa was then secured by a private security company until the early 1990s. Fact and fiction are so intertwined, it is extremely hard to discover which is which.
The facts around the airfield are simple: it existed, because its remains are there. It is not, however, the airstrip that is easily recognised in todays aerial photography. The Winter airstrip was located to the south and oriented southwest-northeast, between 28°04'36"N014°29'22"W and 28°04'57"N014°28'547"W. Use of this airstrip was prohibited from ca. 1950. It remained clearly visible in aerial photography until at least 1973 but began to fade out in photos taken about 10 years later.

Source:
http://www.ronaldv.nl/abandoned/airfields/ES/canary.html

Tegel’s Abandoned Boeing 707

D-ABOC as it sits in an abandoned corner of Berlin-Tegel

Ian Hawkins uncovers the curious tale of Tegel airport’s abandoned Boeing 707…

If there’s anything I’ve learned about Berlin, it’s that everything has a history. Everything. And if something looks a little out of the ordinary, that’s because it is.

We’re trying to explore as much of Berlin as we can. A few weeks ago we went for a walk around Rehberge and Tegel Airport.

The walk took us to the far western end of the airport’s perimeter fence. At the end of the runway, hidden behind a patch of woodland is a big old Boeing 707.

There are lots of old and retired planes used for airport training purposes but this one doesn’t look like any of those. There are no signs of smoke damage or any fire and rescue training facilities nearby. It’s dressed up in 1960s era Lufthansa livery, looks long-forgotten and, like so much of this city, a bit odd.

Boeing 707s date back to that golden age of airliners and passenger jet planes. If you’ve seen black and white photos of Jimi Hendrix or Bob Dylan boarding planes in the 60s, they’re probably getting on board a 707. And if you’ve ever been able to sit through an episode of Pan Am, they’re flying on a 707 too.

They’re before my time but I know 707s from only one source – Peter, Paul and Mary’s version of “Early Mornin’ Rain”. I think Dylan covered it too but the song was written by Gordon Lightfoot after a watching his friend fly home on a 707. He remained stuck on the ground, drunk and unable to afford the airfare.

Anyway, after a few days, I finally remembered to Google Tegel’s 707. Typically for Berlin, it has a pretty amazing story to tell.

Tegel’s 707 was involved in a famous international hijacking incident involving five planes and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which became known as the Dawson’s Field hijackings.

Tegel’s 707 was originally made for the Israeli national airline, El Al in 1961. On 6th September 1970, it was flying as El Al flight 219 from Amsterdam when it was hijacked. Three other planes were also hijacked (TWA flight 741 from Frankfurt, Swissair flight 100 from Zurich and Pan Am Flight 93 from Amsterdam).

Our 707 was hijacked by two terrorists: a South American revolutionary called Patrick Argüello and a woman called Leila Khaled (pictured below). They were supposed to be part of a larger team but their co-hijackers weren’t able to board the plane – so they hijacked Pan Am flight 93 instead.

The hijackers, armed with pistols and grenades, made their move and demanded access to the cockpit. When the pilot learned what was happening, he pulled a nosedive, aka a ‘zero G parabola’.

In the chaos that followed, a grenade failed to detonate and Argüello exchanged fire with an Israeli security guard on board. El Al steward Shlomo Vider was injured by a stray bullet; some reports say Argüello was killed in this exchange, others say that he was shot by the security guard after he’d been restrained. Either way, he died at some point during the flight.

Leila Khaled had removed the pin from her grenade but passengers jumped on her and prevented her from detonating it by holding her fists together – and eventually replacing the pin.

With the hijack effectively over, the flight was diverted to London Heathrow where Leila Khaled was handed over to the authorities.

Soon after, the PFLP hijacked a British BOAC plane and diverted it to Dawson’s Airfield in Jordan. In return for the safe release of the BOAC passengers, Khaled was handed back to the Palestinians.

Passengers of the Swissair and and two Pan Am planes were also released without harm at Dawson’s Airfield. The same can’t be said of the actual planes, which were blown up.

The Tegel 707 continued in service for El Al, then for another Israeli airline called Arkia. In the mid 1980s, Boeing bought it back and gave it to West Berlin in 1987 as part of the city’s 750th birthday celebrations.

Lufthansa had bought its 200th Boeing plane at around that time, and, as a thank you, Boeing re-painted the Tegel 707 in Lufthansa’s 1960s livery. But as West Berlin airspace was under Allied control in the 1980s, Lufthansa weren’t allowed to fly into Tegel.

In fact, no German airline or even a German pilot could fly anything in West Berlin so the plane’s new colours were covered with white stickers and delivered by an American crew at night. By the morning, the stickers were pulled off and Tegel passengers were amazed to see a Lufthansa 707 sitting on the tarmac.

(This Allied airspace agreement even applied to West Berlin’s ADAC rescue helicopter – currently located outside Berlin’s Fire Service Museum – which was only flown by an American pilot).

Eventually, issues around maintenance costs, a suitable publicly accessible site and vandalism pushed the 707 airside – safer and cheaper but out of any meaningful public view. The plane is occasionally used for evacuation training.

And that’s the story of Tegel’s ‘hidden’ 707. I always feel sad to see something that isn’t being put to its intended use. This even applies to old record players or tennis rackets at a flea market. An old chair looks like it’s dying to be sat on again and to me, Tegel’s 707 looks like it’d would love to be flying people around the globe again. I’m sure there are all kinds of reasons why this will never happen.

The words of “Early Mornin’ Rain” came into my head when I saw Tegel’s 707. I’ll think of the 707 every time I play that song.

Source:
http://www.slowtravelberlin.com/tegels-abandoned-boeing-707/

[Lapszemle] Két évvel a Malév után - a magyar légiipari ágazat kilátásairól

Február elején lesz két éve, hogy a Malév összeomlott. Sokak szemében ezzel csorba esett a nemzet büszkeségén, mások az ország lassú lecsúszásának egy újabb stációját látták az eseményekben. Megint mások pedig fellélegeztek, hogy végre megszabadultunk egy életképtelen nyűgtől. A közelgő évforduló alkalmából érdemes összefoglalni, hol is tart a magyar légiközlekedési iparág, és ami még fontosabb: merre fejlődik?


MAGÁNERŐBŐL

A teljes magyar légi közlekedés árbevételét forintosítva nagyjából évi 420 milliárdos forgalmat kapunk (lásd a grafikont az 52. oldalon), amelynek több mint fele repülőjegy-értékesítésből származik, és többnyire külföldi légitársaságok realizálják. Az ágazat többi része is elsősorban külföldi magántulajdonban van. A magyar tulajdonú vállalatok árbevétele ezen a piacon kb. 65 milliárd forint.

Nagyjából két évtizedes trend végpontjaként a magyar állam mára szinte teljesen kivonult a légi közlekedésből. A katonai létesítményeket nem számolva közvetlen állami tulajdonban maradt az országos légi irányítás, néhány vidéki és sportreptér, valamint a Malév két megmaradt leányvállalata (egy földi kiszolgáló és egy repülőgép-karbantartó). Ezenkívül a kormányzatnak egy árszabályozói mechanizmuson keresztül ráhatása van még a Ferihegyi repülőtér árbevételének egy részére, míg a légi irányítás árait egy európai szintű mechanizmus határozza meg. Forintban kifejezve a magyar állam kb. 25 milliárdos árbevételre van ráhatással mint tulajdonos vagy mint árszabályozó.

A kormány ma alig fordít pénzt a légi közlekedésre, szemben az összes többi közlekedési ágazattal, amelyeknek infrastruktúrájához és szállítási tevékenységéhez egyaránt hozzájárul. Gondoljunk itt autópályákra, vasúthálózatra, a tömegközlekedésre stb. Az arányok érzékeltetése végett például a V0-s vasúti körgyűrűre szánt 360 milliárd forint nagyjából 50 évig tudná finanszírozni az összes magyar vidéki repülőtér működését és beruházásait.

Megoszlanak a vélemények a tekintetben, jó-e, hogy az állam ilyen mértékben kivonult ebből a fontos közlekedési ágazatból. Az egyik álláspont szerint a magyar állam két évtizeden keresztül szakmai hibát szakmai hibára halmozott ebben a globalizálódó iparágban. Ezért jobb, hogy csak a minimálisan szükséges szabályozói feladatokat látja el a légi közlekedésben. Példaként a Malév körüli zűröket és a Ferihegyi repülőtér privatizációja előtti botrányokat szokták emlegetni.

A másik álláspont szerint az utóbbi két évtizedben az állam túl sok területet engedett át a magánszektornak, ráadásul külföldieknek. Így az iparágban megtermelt többlet kikerül az országból, és ezzel lassul a helyi gazdaság fejlődése. Itt elsősorban a Budapest Airport privatizációját és a Malév meg nem mentését szokták példaként emlegetni.

Mindkét álláspont könnyen vitatható. A nagyobb állami beavatkozás mellett szól, hogy a világ sok fejlett országában működtet a kormányzat olyan pénzügyi támogatási rendszereket, amelyek a légi összeköttetéseket olyan területekre is kiterjesztik, ahova piaci alapon nem érné meg repülni. Ezenfelül az infrastruktúra működtetésében és a repülőipari megrendelések közt is komoly szerep jut a fejlett nyugati államoknak.

A kérdés inkább az, mely területeken kell a kormányzatnak a piaci erőket pótolnia és milyen formában. Sok példa hozható ugyanis arra is, ahogy az át nem gondolt állami beavatkozás gátolja, torzítja a légi közlekedés vagy a tágabb légiipar fejlődését.


A LÉGITÁRSASÁGOK JÓL VANNAK

Mára köztudott tény, hogy a Malév eltűnését követően a piacon kialakult rést elsősorban fapados légicégek töltötték be. Kevésbé ismert azonban, hogy ennek köszönhetően folytatódott a repülőjegyek árának – a gazdasági válság kirobbanása óta megfigyelhető – csökkenése (lásd a grafikont az 51. oldalon). E meglepő eredmény annak köszönhető, hogy a fapados légitársaságok növelni tudták forgalmi részesedésüket, és karcsúbb szervezeteikkel, valamint nagyobb repülőgépeikkel komoly hatékonyságnövekedést hoztak a piacnak. Ezzel találkozott a gazdasági válság miatti gyérebb kereslet, és a két hatás a repülőjegyárak csökkenéséhez vezetett.

Ugyanezen folyamat hátulütőjeként az üzleti utasokat kiszolgáló légitársaságok kínálata romlott, hiszen helyi fuvarozó híján egyrészt a menetrendek lettek kedvezőtlenebbek, másrészt ebben a szegmensben a jegyárak is többnyire emelkedtek. Vagyis összességében a Malév eltűnésével jól jártak a kispénzű turisták, miközben az üzleti utasok rosszabbul. Részben ennek, valamint a szállodai piacon a válságot megelőzően kialakult túlkínálatnak köszönhető, hogy az ország szállodáit mostanság kispénzű turisták töltik meg (Drágulásra várva – Figyelő, 2013/42. szám).

A Malév összeomlását követően sokakban élt a remény, hogy a romokon valaki új nemzeti légitársaságot szervez majd. Több jelentkező is akadt erre a szerepre, és az állami tisztségviselők is többször hangoztatták, hogy tárgyalnak potenciális befektetőkkel. A kezdeményezések azonban kivétel nélkül elhaltak. Két év alatt világossá vált, hogy a piaci réseket a konkurensek alapvetően befedték, továbbá Magyarországon nem áll rendelkezésre kellő mennyiségű tőke egy új légitársaság sikeres elindításához, ráadásul az önjelölt légicég-alapítóknál nem volt meg a kellő szakmai háttér sem.

A történtek egyik haszonélvezője a Wizz Air lett, amely részben kapacitást növelt Budapesten, részben pedig elnyerte a kijelölést néhány EU-n kívüli útvonalra a Malév helyett. Így a Wizz Air de facto magyar nemzeti légitársaság lett, ami sokakban megütközést váltott ki, pedig ezzel csak a legvalószínűbb forgatókönyv zajlott le.

A Wizz Airrel kapcsolatban azt is meg kell jegyezni, hogy a cég már rég messze túlnőtte a magyar piacot. Forgalmának már csak kb. 15 százaléka kötődik Magyarországhoz, a flottája pedig sokkal nagyobb, mint amekkora a Malévé valaha is volt. Azzal párhuzamosan, hogy Budapestről kelet felé nyitott járatokat a Malév néhány volt útvonalán, a Wizz Air ugyanezt tette más kelet-európai országokból is az általános üzleti stratégiájának részeként.

Mindezzel a légitársaságok magyarországi piaca mára nagyjából konszolidálódott. Nagy léptékű, gyors változások nem valószínűek. Az ország légi forgalma várhatóan a GDP gyarapodásával együtt nő, egy érett, konszolidált piac jellegzetességeit és bővülési rátáját produkálva.

A magyar légiutas-forgalom 99 százaléka Budapesten zajlik. A vidéki repülőterek belátható időn belül nem játszanak meghatározó szerepet az ország légi forgalmában. Az átszálló utasforgalom Budapesten is elenyésző, ugyanakkor az ország felett kb. hatszor több repülőgép halad el, mint amennyi le- és felszáll itt. Ez utóbbi más kis államok esetében is így szokott lenni.

Míg a légitársaságok viszonylag gyorsan és rugalmasan tudják változtatni a kapacitásaikat, addig a kiszolgáló infrastruktúra csak lassan tudja őket követni. A fapadosok 2004-es budapesti megjelenése óta mind a reptér, mind a légi irányítás azzal szembesül, hogy a Ferihegyi repülőteret újfent egyre nagyobb repülőgépek használják, amit az egy gépmozgásra jutó utasszám gyors növekedése mutat.

E tekintetben ráadásul egy nagy ugrás is bekövetkezett a Malév eltűnését követően. Mindez azért fontos, mert a repülőgépek növekedésével arányosan csökken az egy székre vetített üzemelési költségük. Így Budapesten gyakorlatilag egy hatékonyságnövekedés indult be a fapadosok megjelenésével, majd újabb ugrás következett a Malév után. Mindez pedig részben a légitársaságok csökkenő jegyáraiban csapódott le.


SOSEMVOLT SZEREP

A repülőtér és a légi irányítás az árakon keresztül pénzügyileg tudja ezt a helyzetet kezelni. Ez azonban nem javítja az infrastruktúra fizikai értelemben vett kihasználtságát. Összehasonlításképpen: ma a Budapest Airport akkora földterületet foglal el, mint London Heathrow, és ugyanúgy két futópályát üzemeltet, miközben a gépmozgások számát tekintve Heathrow-hoz mérten 18, utasszámban mérve pedig 12 százalékos forgalmat bonyolít. Ráadásul a reptér termináljait alapvetően egy jobban fizető utasközönségre tervezték, ám a fapadosok megjelenése óta mára a kispénzű forgalom került túlsúlyba. Ezzel az ellentmondással szembesülnek az utasok, amikor a modern terminálból bádogfolyosókon át gyalogolnak ki a repülőgépekig.

A légi irányítás számára sem kedvező, hogy egyre kisebb helyi forgalommal szembesül. De az ő esetükben ettől sokkal fontosabb trend, hogy a modern technológiáknak köszönhetően iparágukban a gazdaságos üzemméret ma már messze nagyobb, mint amekkora légtere az egyes kelet-európai kis országoknak van. Piaci viszonyok közt ez már szükségszerű vállalatösszeolvadásokhoz, konszolidációhoz vezetett volna. A légi irányítás azonban eredendően nemzeti alapokon szerveződött, és Európában a nemzeti légi irányító szervezetek ez idáig sikeresen álltak ellen a nemzetek felett átívelő racionalizálásnak. Az iparágban mindenki kíváncsian várja, meddig tartható fenn ez a helyzet.

A közgondolkozás szerint a Malév eltűnésével Budapest elveszítette a kelet-európai gyűjtő-elosztó központ szerepét, miután az eddig itt átszálló utasok ezt most már más repülőtereken teszik meg. A valóság azonban ennél sokkal árnyaltabb. A nagyobb kelet-európai légikikötők elmúlt 20 évi forgalmát összehasonlítva látható, hogy Budapest igazából sosem volt egy nagy központ, és már a 90-es évek végétől elkezdett lemaradni Prágától (lásd a grafikont). Bécs pedig már jóval ez előtt kétszer-háromszor nagyobb forgalmat bonyolított, mint e két város.

A Malév eltűnése kedvezően hatott Bécs forgalmára, ugyanakkor nem egyértelmű, hogy Prága és Varsó számottevően profitált volna ugyanebből. Sőt, egyelőre úgy tűnik, a helyi légitársaságok életben tartásáért ezek a városok a Budapesten a Malévot követően lezajlott hatékonyságnövekedési ugrás elmaradásával fizetnek meg. Arról nem beszélve, hogy a Malév jellemzően kispénzű átszálló forgalma sem egy igazán vonzó üzleti szegmens.

Külön szót érdemel még a Budapest Airport földi megközelíthetősége, amely a kezdetek óta csak közúton lehetséges, miközben a reptér utasforgalma megtöbbszöröződött. A vasúti vagy metrós tervekből csak egy pénzt lényegében nem igénylő megoldás valósult meg, amikor kialakítottak egy vasúti megállót az 1-es terminál mellett. Ez azonban nemsokára funkcióját vesztette, amikor a repülőtér bezárta a terminált.

Legfrissebb fejleményként e téren a budapesti taxis tarifák újraszabályozásával a Fővárosi Önkormányzat eltörölte a reptéri transzferárakat, jócskán megemelve a repülőtérre történő taxizás árát. Így az új tarifák homlokegyenest szembemennek a trenddel, miszerint a légikikötő forgalma elmozdult a kispénzű utasok irányába. Ráadásul a fix kilométerárak azt az egyszerű közgazdasági összefüggést is figyelmen kívül hagyják, hogy a szállítási szolgáltatások egységköltsége csökken a megtett távolság függvényében.


MINEK IDE AZ ÁLLAM?

Az állam szerepének növelése mellett érvelők leginkább a Budapest Airport állami kézbe vételét szokták célként emlegetni. Ennek feltételezett haszna azonban kétséges, hiszen a repülőtér mozgástere a további hatékonyságnövelés tekintetében eléggé korlátos, és alapvetően a légitársaságok lépéseitől függ. Másrészt a reptérnek ugyancsak kevés a ráhatása a saját forgalmára, hiszen ez is a légitársaságok döntéseitől függ elsősorban.

Üzemelési szempontból ezért nem valószínű, hogy az állami tulajdonlás bármilyen többletet hozna a légikikötőnek. Az sem egyértelmű, hogy a magyar állam olcsóbban tudná finanszírozni a repülőteret, miután a nyugati befektetők maguk is hozzáférnek a legolcsóbb forrásokhoz. A kérdés tehát úgy vetődik fel, mennyi többletet termel a repülőtér, és megéri-e ezt a magyar államnak megvásárolnia.

Mindenesetre a szavakon túl az államosítás tekintetében nem sok történt, sőt, a folyamatok inkább az ellentétes irányba mutatnak. 2011-ben a Magyar Nemzeti Vagyonkezelő élt az opciójával, és eladta a repülőtér maradék 25 százalékát is. Ezt követően az állam több lehetőséget is elszalasztott a reptér visszavásárlására vagy egyszerűen arra, hogy belépjen a külföldi finanszírozók helyére.

Ami a hosszabb távú kilátásokat illeti, arra lehet számítani, hogy folytatódik a Ferihegyi repülőtér infrastruktúrájának lassú hozzáigazítása a valós piaci igényekhez. Ez alapvetően az infrastruktúra egyszerűsítését jelenti ahhoz hasonlóan, ahogy például a londoni Stansted légikikötő átvedlett az eredeti klasszikus szerepéből a mai fapadosba. A repülőgépeket kiszolgáló vállalatok (üzemanyag-ellátó, földi kiszolgáló, catering stb.) életében sem várható drasztikus változás, lévén, hogy ügyfeleik, vagyis a légitársaságok mára alapvetően konszolidálódtak Budapesten.

A szerző a londoni ICF SH&E légiközlekedési tanácsadója

Forrás:
http://figyelo.hu/cikkek/ket-evvel-a-malev-utan

Hijacked!

Narrator: On the morning of September 6th, 1970, three teams of Palestinian hijackers -- all in their mid-20s -- arrived at different European airports. They were going to hijack three planes bound for the United States They would divert them to a landing strip in the Jordanian desert, hold passengers and crew as hostages, and use them to gain the release of Palestinian militants held in Europe and Israel. The plan was the brainchild of a small guerrilla group, the PFLP -- the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

September 6, 1970

DAY 1

Narrator: The first targeted plane was El Al flight 219 from Amsterdam to New York. Four hijackers were assigned to take it over, including a Palestinian woman, Leila Khaled.

Leila Khaled, Hijacker: We knew that the plane had armed guards. But who could resist four people armed with guns and hand grenades? We thought they would be afraid of us.

Uri Bar Lev, Captain: We began the pre-flight check-ups. Then the El Al station manager and the head of security came in to the cockpit. They told me: "Listen, we have four suspicious passengers." I asked, "Why are they suspicious?" The head of security told me that they all bought their tickets in advance, but they all came in the last minute to pick them up. Two had bought tickets for first class and two for economy. Those from economy class were light-skinned. Those who had bought tickets for first class were black. They had Senegalese passports and their passport numbers were in sequence; one ended in five, the other one ended in six.

Narrator: Captain Lev decided to allow Khaled and her partner, Patrick Arguello, a Nicaraguan-American sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, to remain on the flight. He had the two Palestinians with suspicious passports removed.

Michal Adar, Flight Attendant: About 20 minutes after taking off, when the plane had almost reached its cruising altitude, we heard a scream from the economy section. The purser told me to go back to economy and see what was happening.

Leila Khaled: We ran towards the cockpit. We passed through the first class -- it was a matter of seconds. I heard some shooting and then I saw someone in first class grabbing the telephone and trying to call someone.

Michal Adar: I entered the first class cabin. It was empty. Then I saw a fist tear the curtain. A nice looking man in his early twenties was looking at me. He had a grenade in one hand, a pistol in the other. He said, in English, "Open the cockpit door."

Leila Khaled: I showed them the two activated hand grenades and asked them to open the door. One of the flight attendants was also banging on the door saying, "Open! Open!" Someone looked through the peephole but did not open the door.

Uri Bar Lev: We heard the knocks on the door and the purser Abraham rang, calling us on the intercom. He told me: "there are a male and a female hijacker. They demand that you should open the cockpit door, otherwise they will kill and blow up the plane.

I decided that we were not going to be hijacked. The security guy was sitting here ready to jump. I told him that I was going to put the plane into negative-G mode. Everyone would fall. When you put the plane into negative, it's like being in a falling elevator. Instead of the plane flying this way, it dives and everyone who is standing falls down.

Narrator: In the chaos created by the sudden dive of the plane, several passengers overpowered Khaled. One of the air marshals on board shot Arguello.

Less than an hour after take off, El Al flight 219 made an emergency landing in London.

Leila Khaled was arrested. Patrick Arguello was taken to a local hospital, where he was declared dead upon arrival.

In failing to hijack the El Al plane, the PFLP had lost its most important target. It had hoped to use the Israeli passengers on board to force Israel to release Palestinians held prisoner.

But the multiple hijacking plan had not gone completely awry.

Earlier that morning, on TWA flight 74 from Frankfurt to New York, hijackers had met little resistance.

Rudi Swinkels, Purser: I saw a passenger running towards first class. I ran after him and when he came to first class to the cockpit, he turned around, had a gun in his hand, and pointed the gun at me, and said, "Get back, get back." So right away, I dove behind the bulkhead first class divider and I hid behind it, over here.

Rivke Berkowitz, Passenger: A woman's voice came over the loud speaker and she said, "This is your new captain speaking. This flight has been taken over by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. We will take you to a friendly country with friendly people."

Narrator: Swiss Air flight 100 from Zurich to New York was seized minutes later and diverted. The two planes carrying more than 300 hostages were now headed toward the Middle East.

Marvin Kalb, Journalist: I heard about the story because, in fact, the CBS Newsroom in Washington alerted me. This was America's introduction to global terrorists. America really had not had any serious exposure to terrorism before this time. And it took another day or so before many of us realized that most of the people on the planes were Americans.

Walter Cronkite (archival): Palestinian guerrillas in a bold coordinated action created this newest crisis Sunday, and in so doing, they accomplished what they set out to do. They thrust back to the world's attention a problem diplomats have tended to shove aside in hesitant steps towards Middle East peace.

Narrator: By early evening President Richard Nixon had cut short his Labor Day weekend in California and returned to Washington.

The White House's primary cause for concern was the delicate Cold War balance of power in the Middle East. At the time, the U.S. was allied with Israel and the Soviet Union with most Arab countries. Nixon decided that he and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, would personally manage the crisis.

Marvin Kalb: We have to remember that in those days, the fundamental issue for Nixon and Kissinger was: in what way does a foreign policy issue affect the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union? That was the thing right upfront in their minds. And at this point, they did not know immediately how it would affect the balance, but they knew it could, and that's what was important.

Narrator: Three planes had been targeted for hijacking on September 6. There would soon be a fourth. After being removed from the El Al flight, the two Palestinians with Senegalese passports managed to purchase first class tickets on Pan Am flight 93 from Amsterdam to New York.

John Feruggio, Flight Director: We were ready for take off in Amsterdam, and the airplane came to an abrupt stop in the middle of the runway. And Captain Priddy called me up into the cockpit and says, "I'd like to have a word with you." I went up to the cockpit, and he says, "We have two passengers by the name of Diop and Gueye." He says, "Go down and try to find them in the manifest, because I would like to have a word with them."

Pat Lavix, Co-Pilot: Captain Priddy said to them, "I apologize for asking but I am going to have to search you. And they said, "Search us."

John Ferruggio: So Captain Priddy sat them down at these two seats over here. He gave them a pretty good pat. They had a Styrofoam container in their groin area where they carried the grenade, and the 25mm pistols. But this we found out much later.

Control Tower: This is clipper 93 clear for take-off...

Pat Lavix: This was all prior to take-off and then we talked to the company, and the company agreed, go ahead, so now we've been given permission to take off and we did.

Narrator: With their hidden weapons, the hijackers easily seized the plane and forced the pilot to fly toward the Middle East.

By late afternoon, news of the multiple hijackings reached Amman's Intercontinental Hotel.

Gerald Seymour, Journalist: It's a Sunday afternoon, the bar would have been open and then the first telex came through telling us of the hijacking. So we had the El Al, then we were hearing of a TWA, then we were hearing of a Swiss Air, then we were hearing of a Pan American, and now we were getting -- you know -- a bit fidgety because this is on a scale of hijacking that none of us had seen before. As dusk came, I remember the first message coming in, which really set us a light, that planes were believed to be heading towards Jordanian airspace.

Narrator: The PFLP was part of a growing Palestinian guerrilla movement based in Jordan. Stunned by Israel's victory over their Arab allies in the Six Days War three years earlier, many Palestinians felt that they needed to take control of their fate -- by any means possible.

George Habash, PFLP, Co-Founder: What happened in the 1967 War destroyed our dreams. We said that the world does not understand or know about the Palestinian problem. This is how the idea of hijacking planes came about. Let the whole world know about the crisis that happened to us.

Bassam Abu Sharif, PFLP, Spokesman: The main goal of this operation was to gain the release of all of our political prisoners jailed in Israel in exchange for the hostages.

William Quandt, National Security Council: This was in an era when Vietnam had demonstrated that small, backward countries could stand up to Superpowers, and there was some sense in which the Palestinians were trying to emulate that. I think the Palestinians generally -- and the PFLP within the Palestinian movement -- knew they had a weak hand. The guerrilla war option was not going to work quite as it had in Vietnam. So I think they were always were trying to find ways to do things that had highly dramatic content to get attention.

Narrator: The hijacked airliners were being flown to an abandoned airstrip in the Jordanian desert: a remote site under Palestinian control. The hijackers had dubbed it "Revolution Airport."

Bassam Abu Sharif: One of our commanders asked me to go to Revolution Airport. I asked, "Where is that airport?" He said, "Some guys will lead you. But it is not an airport. It is a desert."

Abu Samir, "Revolution Airport," PFLP: In this area the ground is very hard. The largest planes on earth could land there. I asked our commander, "why did you choose this place?" He told me that a geologist had confirmed that the strip could support anything -- even if the Devil walked on it.

In order to make an airport, what should one do?

We brought 200 barrels and gallons of diesel and a group of fighters to protect the area. We filled barrels with dust and with diesel-soaked rags, and we sat and waited.

Narrator: Revolution Airport was in one of the many areas of Jordan controlled by Palestinian factions, that had united under an umbrella group, the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Talcott Seelye, State Dept. Task Force: We had in Jordan a situation where the PLO had created a state within a state. They had roadblocks all over Amman, the capital. They were controlling the North...

They were challenging the leadership of King Hussein.

William Quandt: The first time I ever went to Jordan, it was in the early part of 1970 and you literally could not travel around in Amman without a PLO escort. It as if the Jordanian state had ceased to exist.

Ambassador Seelye: So you had the hostage crisis, which was kind of a spark for an already incendiary situation.

Narrator: TWA Flight 74 from Frankfurt was the first to land at Revolution Airport, touching down at 6:45pm. On board were 145 passengers and 10 crewmembers.

Rudi Swinkels, Purser: We circled a couple of times, and after we landed we looked outside and we saw, like torches stuck in oil drums.

Abu Samir: We were afraid. Could you imagine how the passengers felt? We were anxious that the operation would fail . ..it was a big responsibility.

Rivke Berkowitz, Passenger: As soon as we touched ground, the plane was rushed by people in army fatigues with Kafias on, and with all kinds of weaponry that I had not seen in my life.

Narrator: Barely ten minutes later, Swiss Air flight 100 from Zurich landed with 143 passengers and 12 crew members on board.

Paul Fehse, Passenger: I looked outside. I see nothing. And then, out of the blue -- boom -- we hit hard. We hit so hard I thought we had crashed. And everybody was rushing for the doors, thinking the plane was going to blow up.

Bassam Abu Sharif: I saw an old lady opening her purse taking dollars bills. She tried to put them in the hand of one of our fighters. I spanked her hand. She was scared to death. I said, "Take back your money. We are not thieves; we are people fighting for freedom."

Narrator: "The desert grew very cold at night," Bassam Abu Sharif would later write in his diary. "My comrades went around wiring detonators to large lumps of plastic explosives placed under the seats."

Narrator: There was still one more hijacked plane in the air: Pan Am flight 93. Its pilot, Captain John Priddy, convinced the hijackers that the 747 was too big to land in the desert. After refueling in Beirut, the plane headed towards Cairo.

John Ferruggio: We took off out of Beirut, and shortly after that I saw the demolition individual with a suitcase and he was wiring up the airplane with dynamite. And I said to him, "What's going to happen to this airplane?" And he said, "What do you care about this imperialistic airplane?" I said, "What about my imperialistic ass and my passengers?"

Pat Lavix: We had to circle. The hijackers would look out the window and they would confirm: "Yes, indeed, this is Cairo." They could tell even though it was nighttime.

John Ferruggio: And I said to all the attendants: "Now hear this, and hear it good. When this plane comes to a complete stop in Cairo..." [which was our destination point] I said, "Don't wait for me, don't wait for the captain, and don't wait for Jesus Christ. We are going to evacuate the plane, like right now. I looked around and saw this gentlemen lighting up fuses on dynamite as we were descending.

Narrator: Flight director John Ferrugio hurriedly gave evacuation instructions, which one of the passengers managed to record on a tape deck.

John Ferruggio (recorded evacuation order): We don't want you to do this here so that nobody will get hurt. Just pay attention to what your stewardess says. At each door, go down to the bottom of the ramp and then get away from the aircraft."

Pat Lavix: We were probably no more than 40 or 50, 60 feet away from the airplane and the entire cockpit blew off. When I looked up at the nose of the airplane, it was gone, and I could see the captain's seat was sitting on the floor all by itself.

Narrator: All the passengers and crew managed to escape safely. The hijackers were arrested by Egyptian police.

DAY 2

Gerald Seymour: We are bumping along a dirt road, seeing absolutely nothing, when over the top of the hill comes a Jeep Land rover, a great dust storm bellowing along behind it. We waved the chap down; it's an Italian engineer. "Excuse me, Sir, have you seen any airplanes?" (...which might seem a pretty damn fatuous question...) "Yes," he said, "over there." "Thank you." And we powered back in, and bump along a bit further, and then we go over a rim ... It's a hell of a long time ago, and I can see that sight absolutely clearly in my mind now. They were laid out like little children's toys. We just stopped there in amazement because we were in the middle of nowhere.

Narrator: Mid-morning, the PFLP issued their first ultimatum: they would blow up the planes with their passengers onboard, unless Leila Khaled, and Palestinian militants imprisoned in Israel and Europe were released within 72 hours.

The U.S. and European countries whose citizens were being held hostage, agreed to negotiate with the PFLP via the International Red Cross. Israel refused to participate in the negotiations.

Gerald Seymour: The PFLP spokesman had decided that having got the media there -- and our ranks had swelled during the course of the day -- what he needed to do was to have a news conference.

Press Conference:

Q: "Excuse me we want the captain and the stewardess to tell us about the sanitary condition on the TWA plane. How things are..."

A: "Would you like to smell? What do you think -- they don't have water. What do you think, asking this kind of questions?"

Gerald Seymour: The spokesman for the PFLP, Bassam, thought then that there could be some sort of give-and-take of statements.

Press Conference

Q: "The American girl here, can she just tell us how the passengers are?"

A: "We are very crowded and I think the women and especially the children are very restless."

Gerald Seymour: At that time, 1970, it would have been believed that by fog horn statements, they could convince the outside world -- beyond the boundaries of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon -- of the rightness of their cause.

PLFP Card: "The fact that Imperialist interests are linked with the existence of Israel will make our struggle against Israel, a struggle against Imperialism.

Gerald Seymour: This today would seem to show a quite stunning naivety. It would seem to show almost a childlike innocence.

Walter Cronkite (archival): Well, here is the situation on that airstrip in the Jordanian desert thirty miles from Amman. Arab guerrillas hold as captives some 300 nationals from the United States, Britain, West Germany, Switzerland, Israel and even now from some Arab lands.

Talcott Seelye: It was an extremely stark moment. It was something that caught us completely unaware. We never thought that would happen, and it was the first time it had happened.

Narrator: The White House faced a dual crisis: a hostage situation with hundreds of American lives in danger and a pro-American government, Jordan, at the point of collapse.

William Quandt: The PFLP knew on some level that King Hussein could not remain a king while having his country basically occupied by these armed and independent actors. So when they acted this way, they knew that it would bring about some kind of confrontation with King Hussein.

Marvin Kalb: If the Palestinian extremists were to take control of a country like Jordan, how does that tip the balance? The Soviet Union had a very close relationship then with the Syrian regime and with the Egyptian regime. This was the kind of crisis that evoked, in Kissinger's mind, many historical parallels. Just as pre-World War I, a shot fired in Sarajevo could trigger a World War. In Kissinger's mind, a shot fired in Amman, Jordan or Jerusalem, likewise could trigger a World War.

John Sheehan, CBC Reporter (archival): The 305 hostages were told that they would be killed if the governments of Great Britain, Switzerland , West Germany and Israel refuse to release Palestinian prisoners.

Narrator: The increasing friction in Jordan between the Army and Palestinian guerrillas was evident at Revolution Airport. Palestinian militants guarding the planes were themselves surrounded by Jordanian troops, tanks and armored personnel carriers. It was a tense and unpredictable standoff.

Abu Samir: The Jordanian general came and assessed the situation. We negotiated with him. We told him you should take your troops a mile back and we will free the women and children.

CBS Reporter: The Jordanian Chief of Staff has been negotiating with the Commandos. He succeeded in getting them to release the women and children...

Rivke Berkowitz, Passenger: They said that they wanted all the women and children off the plane, and I said to my husband, "I'm not going." I said, "I want us to stay together." And he said, "You have to go. Whatever is going to happen it will be a lot easier if I know that you and Talia are safe."

As we leave they ask our names, and they ask our religion. I just said I was Jewish, because all my life I had grown up in the shadow of the Holocaust, and I always thought that one day my turn was going to come. And I thought, this is my turn, so I didn't think twice about it. But the girl who was following me said to them, "but what do you want to know?" and he said, "Ah, Jewish?" And she said, "No, I am Protestant." And I don't think they saw us as a group of people who were Americans and related to each other as Americans. I didn't realize at the time, that what they were doing was they were dividing us up.

Bassam Abu Sharif (in desert press conference):

Q: "Why are you keeping the Jewish women and children?"

A: "They are not kept because they are Jewish. They are kept just for interrogation, the reason I mentioned: the dual citizenship -- Israel and the United States of America."

Barbara Mensch, Passenger: The two friends that I was with -- one was Jewish, and my oldest friend Nancy, who was not Jewish -- when they separated us... you know, it was the first time in my life that I had been separated, that I had been identified as Jewish, and something different happened to me... that my treatment was different because I was Jewish.

William B. Quandt: The Palestinians tried to make an argument, especially the leftists, that they were not anti-Semitic, but that they were anti-Zionist.

PFLP postcard: (A Lenin quote) "The idea of a Jewish Nation is an erroneous Zionist idea and reactionary in essence."

William B. Quandt: They did not go around asking people about their political views; they asked them about what their religion was. So, it is not a smart thing to do if you are trying to combat the common view that you were somehow focusing on people as Jews or non-Jews, rather than Zionists and non-Zionists.

Rivke Berkowitz: We were still standing there and when they finished loading, they told us to go back on the plane. So we got on the plane, and I went to my husband and I said, "Well, now at least whatever we have to face, we'll face it together."

Gerald Seymour: The light was going down, and that sort of sudden drift towards the dusk that you have in that part... And we would have needed to get back to Amman -- all the television crews, all the newspapermen who had to file. And you almost have a feeling of disgust and shame as a reporter, that you're going back to your air-conditioned hotel, the kitchen's on the tap, and the bar is open waiting for you. And you are leaving people behind, who are in, you know, in a bad and unpleasant and frightening situation.

Rivke Berkowitz: The electricity is turned off in the plane, and they hang a lantern in the middle of the plane, which is our one source of light. Some of the terrorists came on the plane and woke up one of the flight attendants, and said we're going to call some names of people that we want to interview. And I knew that they were going to say out names. I don't know how I knew... I just, I was just waiting for it -- to hear Berkowitz -- and the first name was Berkowitz. And I woke up my husband and I said to him, "you better put on your shoes. I think they are taking you off the plane."

Rudi Swinkels: The women -- the wives -- are sitting there, and screaming, you know, because: "Oh my god, I'm never going to see my husband again." You know, and they were interrogated and taken off the airplane after that.

Rudi Swinkels:

Q: What did you feel when they were taking the men off the plane?

A: I thought I was never going to see them again. They're going to kill them.

Narrator: PFLP gunmen took Jerry Berkowitz, three U.S. government employees and two rabbis to a hideout 100 miles away, in case Israel attempted a rescue operation at Revolution Airport.

Rivke Berkowitz: I sat with the wives of those men who were taken with my husband, and they said, "Oh, they'll be back shortly." And we sat all night, and we waited for them to come back, and they didn't come back.

DAY 3

Dan Rather (archival): The White House is showing signs of edginess and grave concern. For the first 36 hours, the White House publicly all but ignored the hijackings in comment and action. The White House is doing its best not to convey any impression of panic.

Harold Saunders, National Security Council, 1961-: The question really was: what could you do with a couple of airplanes out in the desert and no American military presence nearby? All these crises were frustrating because you did not know what to do exactly about them.

Dan Rather (archival): Tonight, President Nixon called a meeting of his top advisers. But indications of urgency are beginning to pile up in a lot of little ways, including the suddenness in which tonight's Presidential meeting was announced.

Narrator: After the meeting, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird received a phone call from the president. Nixon, Laird recalled, wanted to bomb the PFLP forces and facilities near Revolution Airport.

Harold Saunders: President Nixon had a way of... on the spur of the moment, suggesting strong actions, that maybe, on second thought, even he would not have followed through on. And his senior staff somehow had to deal with those instructions. In this case, I think Melvin Laird found that the weather was not good or something and that was the end of the suggestion for bombing. Years later, Secretary Laird would admit that the weather was just an excuse. Given America's involvement in Vietnam, he did not want to drag the nation into a new military adventure.

Narrator: Back at the desert airstrip, the clock was ticking. In a little more than 24 hours, the PFLP deadline would expire.

Bassam Abu Sharif:

Q: (over Hostages) Bassam, don't you agree that you are the one who began threatening innocent civilians? What is the difference between then and what is happening now?

A: Yes, I told you. It was a violent act. But there were some conditions. Not to hurt any civilian hostages, but to keep them only for exchange. We were very careful. It was possible that Israel would have attacked. Then it would have been Israel who would have killed them -- not us.

Ali Ghandour, Jordanian Gov't. Negotiator: I talked to some responsible people in the PLO, and particularly in the Popular Front. "Why did you do this? Why do you do this? I mean I don't understand it." They said they'd like to draw the world opinion -- the world attention -- towards the Palestinian cause. I said, "But the world is not your enemy. Those people are innocent people; they are not your enemies. You are not at war with them, and the Palestinian cause is a very beautiful cause. It is a just cause. Why do you make it looks that ugly?"

Narrator: All eyes were now on Jerusalem. Would the Israelis join with the Americans and Europeans and negotiate with the PFLP for the release of the hostages? Or would Prime Minister Golda Meir order a military strike in retaliation?

Golda Meir (archival, press conference): The whole world is watching an atrocity unfold unlike anything we have ever seen before. We're talking about people being held in the desert for days -- hundreds of people. On the radio we hear almost idyllic news that they have some food. But no water. Can you imagine? In the heat of the desert, those children don't have any water. The whole world is watching this ... and the best idea they've come up with is to pay bribes.

Shlomo Hillel, Israeli Minister of Police: At that time we could not even imagine negotiating with terrorists. We wanted to fight them, and thought that we were winning. We knew that giving in to terrorists only encourages them. There is nothing easier than to capture a unprotected non-Israeli plane, hijack it to a remote place and then demand that Israel release its prisoners.

ITN Reporter: The greatest anxiety among the passengers on board must lie with the Jewish hostages, now that the Israeli government have refused to exchange them for captured commandos.

Narrator: Israel's position also made the work of the Red Cross far more complicated. It could offer the PFLP only Leila Khaled and six of her comrades held in Europe, not the thousands of prisoners in Israel that the militants had requested.

Michel Bard, Negotiator, International Red Cross: We were living under pressure from one side, threats from the other. We had to face danger of an outside intervention ... ultimatums and notably the risk of an Israeli military intervention, which was for us, the ultimate risk.

Reporter: Can we go back to this hard question about the deadline? Are you saying that the deadline will be on four a.m., Wednesday? No, four a.m., on Thursday? Four a.m. on Wednesday or Thursday?

Michel Bard: The tension was extraordinary. I believe we were at the dawn of a new war ... and not only a local one.

Walter Cronkite, CBS Special Report (archival): Well, here is the situation as of this morning. The guerrillas have extended the deadline for the expiration for their Ultimatum for the release of their fellow terrorists, giving the International Red Cross an opportunity to negotiate for the release of the plane hostages.

Narrator: Seventy-two hours into the crisis, some 200 hostages were still imprisoned in the desert while the conditions in Amman were deteriorating rapidly.

The 125 women and children who had been released the day before were now under siege in the Intercontinental Hotel.

BBC Reporter (archival, in hotel lobby): In the hotel lobby the area is deserted of guests because there's a sniping battle going on just outside the door here, now.

Narrator: As Jordan slipped into civil war, the hostages' safe haven was fast becoming a battle zone.

Paul Fehse: One morning we woke up -- they were bombing the hotel while we were in it, and shooting it. My friend Joe and I we were at a landing between two floors reading Mad magazines and laughing -- when all of a sudden, we heard machine guns and what sounded like a bomb. One bomb landed near the hotel. Everybody panicked and ran out of their rooms into the halls.

Narrator: On September 9, Jordanian troops managed to escort the 125 hostages out of the country. Two hundred hostages, however, remained stranded in the desert.

Rivke Berkowitz: They brought us water in which they had put chlorine tablets to sterilize it. So what we were drinking was similar to drinking heavily chlorinated, warm pool water. So we only drank it when we were very thirsty and just could not help ourselves anymore. And actually we were like that about going to the bathroom too, because it was so disgusting. You didn't go in there unless you had to.

Abu Samir: In the first two days, we did not have a problem with food. But then, you know, there were hundreds of people and we could not just give them falafel that we ate ourselves. Now I am telling the story in few words, but then it felt like a lifetime. It was a big responsibility, big responsibility.

Gerald Seymour: You have this extremely complex attack plan on four airlines, but what was to happen after that -- I have the impression that they had no comprehension of it at all. They did not have the sophistication, nor, let it be said, did they at that time, have the ruthlessness to press home the initial attack on the airplanes by killing people. They did not have that ruthlessness. Ok, they were to learn it but they hadn't got it then.

Narrator: Once it became clear that the PFLP was not going to execute hostages, its bargaining position weakened. Then, on September 9, a PFLP sympathizer hijacked a British BOAC plane on route to London -- a fourth hijacked plane with 105 passenger and 9 crew members on board.

DAY 7

Barbara Mensch: Each day on the plane, they kept promising to release us. So I thought, Ok, I'll spend another night on the plane, and then I'll get off the next day. We got this everyday; we got a promise, and then they started taking us off. I was one of the first people that they identified to take off ...

Narrator: After evacuating all of the passengers, the PFLP blew up the three planes in succession.

Barbara Mensch: I was scared because we were very close to the planes; the stuff was, you know, parts of the planes were flying out at us. The scary part was being surrounded by the Jordanian army because the PFLP folks had rifles with them and they pointed their guns at us.

Abu Samir: The Army came at that very moment. We told them, "Here are the hostages. If you touch us, either we all die or you let us go."

Barbara Mensch: Then, you know, we got through that moment. I thought, Ok, well, now -- finally, each time it was ok, now finally -- I am going to get out of this situation. And then, we drove in a kind of a caravan, in a line, and all the Jeeps went into one direction and mine went in another.

Narrator: Barbara Mensch and 54 other Jewish passengers and all the male crewmembers were separated from the rest. The remaining hostages, including the BOAC passengers, were taken to the Intercontinental Hotel. Among them was Rivke Berkowitz.

Rivke Berkowitz (archival, news interview):

My husband was on board ...

Q: Where is he now?

A: I don't know.

Q: Do you have a dual Israeli-American passport?

A: I have an American passport.

Q: Does he have an American passport?

A: American passport. We're both American-born.

Bassam Abu Sharif: The PFLP also transferred the passengers who are classified as subjects under interrogation into a more cozy place. And they will be kept there until our prisoners are released.

Barbara Mensch: The next thing I remember is being taken off the Jeep, and being told that I was no longer a hostage, but I was now a political prisoner. And that unless my country did something, I was going to be a political prisoner, for, I don't know, forever. I just remember crying, and I thought, "Oh my god, I am going to be here forever. This is never going to end."

BBC Reporter: The Arab Commandos called this the Revolution Airport. Today, it could be called "Desolation Airport"...

Gerald Seymour: You had an impression that the Palestinians had played it out by the end of that week, and therefore the blowing up of the aircraft was drawing the curtain on the show.

Narrator: Two days later King Hussein ordered his army to fight its way into the Palestinian refugee camps. and uproot the militants.

The growing crisis in Jordan now occupied both the U.S. administration and the Israeli government.

The fighting also overshadowed the negotiations, making them far more complicated.

It took more than two weeks to extricate Barbara Mensch and the remaining hostages from the destroyed Palestinian neighborhoods in Amman. They were exchanged for Leila Khaled and six other PFLP militants.

Several days later, Jerry Berkovitz and five other hostages hidden in a basement were finally freed. All of the hijackers managed to escape.

William Quandt: Palestinians would say, I suppose, that they did not have great choices -- that there weren't ways of getting world's attention by having peaceful demonstrations. Somehow they had to show how dire the situation was by inflicting pain.

But I also think that once you get started with this kind of militancy, it is hard to turn it off. People began to compete for ways of doing other more dramatic blows.

It is difficult to stop once you've developed that as one of your modus opperandi.

Narrator: The unprecedented events of September, 1970 would soon be forgotten.

But they would mark the end of one era and the beginning of another -- a more violent and dangerous time when terrorists would no longer hesitate to take the lives of innocent people.


Source:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/hijacked/filmmore/pt.html

A Dawson's Field-i túszdráma

Leila Khaled - ránézésre ártalmatlannak tűnik

1970. szeptember 6-át írunk. Az El Al 219-es járata Izraelből érkezik Amszterdamba, hogy az itt felszálló utasokkal 13:20-kor tovább folytassa útját New York felé. A járatra négy palesztin terroristának is jegye van, ám közülük kettőt nem engednek fel a járatra, mert a légitársaság embereinek szemet szúr a felmutatott szenegáli útlevelek egymást követő sorszáma. A másik kettő hamis hondurasi útlevele azonban nem kelt gyanút, sőt a pár hölgytagját sem ismerik fel, így azok bebocsátást nyernek a gépbe, ahol elfoglalják helyüket a turistaosztály második sorában. (Leila Khaled egy évvel korábban, 1969. aug. 29-én egy korábbi tettestársával Damaszkuszba térítette majd ott felrobbantotta a TWA 840-es, Rómából Athénon keresztül Tel Avivba tartó járatát.) Mintegy húsz perccel a felszállást követően Khaled elővesz két kézigránátot, feláll, és az utasok legnagyobb megrökönyödésére kibiztosítja azokat. Míg társa kézifegyverével fedezi, Khaled előremegy a cockpithoz. Követeli, hogy engedjék be, és azzal fenyegetőzik, hogy felrobbantja a gépet. Uri Bar Lev kapitány azonban úgy dönt, történjék bármi, nem enged a zsarolásnak. A cockpitban ülőket, köztük a járat biztonsági emberét, felkészíti, hogy kockázatos manőverbe, negatív G-módba fogja tenni a gépet. Terve szerint mindenki, aki áll, és nincs becsatolva a fedélzeten, az a fellépő erők hatására el fog esni, de legalábbis elveszti egyensúlyát. Számítása bejön, ugyanis amint a gép leadja az orrát, mindkét géprabló elesik. Khaledet az utasok gyűrik le, míg társát a légimarshall sebesíti meg, mint később kiderül, halálosan, miután előbbi többször is rálőtt az egyik stewardra. A 138 utas és 10 fős személyzet mintegy húsz perccel a túszdráma kitörését követően kényszerleszállást hajt végre Londonban. Khaledet letartóztatják, ám a járatról lemaradó másik két terrorista ekkorra már akcióba lendül egy másik repülőgép fedélzetén.

Ennyi maradt a Panam 747-eséből...

A Pan Am 93-as járata Brüsszelből érkezik, és szintén New Yorkba tart. A gép délután 2 óra után valamivel már készen áll a felszállásra, mikor a kapitány, Jack Priddy magához hívatja a járatfelelőst, és azt kéri, kerítse elő az utolsóként felszállt két utast, mert beszélni akar velük. (Nem tudni, hogy az útlevük tette-e őket ismét gyanússá, esetleg addigra már elérte őket az ElAl-gépeltérítésének híre...) A két ominózus utas beleegyezésével maga a kapitány vizsgálja át őket. Mivel semmit sem talál náluk, mindenki megkönnyebbül, s egy darabig eseménytelenül zajlik a repülőút. Azonban az ölükben gránátokat és pisztolyokat a fedélzetre csempésző palesztinoknak sikerül hatalmába kerítenie a B747-est, majd Bejrútba repülniük vele. Itt több szimpatizáns is csatlakozik a géprablókhoz, akik akár az egész repülőgép felrobbantásához elegendő robbanóanyagot is magukkal hoznak a fedélzetre. Az este fél 10-kor felszálló gép számára egy Dawson's Field nevű egykori Royal Air Force-repülőtér lett volna a következő állomás, ám a terroristák nem biztosak benne, hogy egy Jumbo jet biztonságos leszállásához is megfelelő-e a pálya, ezért helyette Kairó repülőtere mellett döntenek. Két órán keresztül köröznek fölötte, mire meggyőződnek róla, valóban Kairóban vannak, majd hajnali 2 után végül leszállnak. A gépet, a 136 utas és tizenhét főnyi személyzet evakuálását követően percekkel, a terroristák felrobbantják. A géprablókat az egyiptomi rendőrség letartóztatja. 

Az ElAl és a Pan Am gépeinek eltérítésével egy időben azonban még két gép esik aznap terroristák fogságába.

Valamikor a déli órákban érkezik meg Frankfurtba a TWA, Tel Avivból Athénon keresztül New Yorkba tartó, 741-es járata. A B707-est nem sokkal a felszállást követően az ellenállás legkisebb jele nélkül térítik a jordániai Ammántól nem messze fekvő egykori brit légibázis, Dawson's Field döngölt talajú, olajoshordók által megvilágított "repülőterére". A Carroll D. Woods kapitány vezette gép kora este érkezik meg ide 144 utasával és 11 főnyi személyzetével.

A Swissair HB-IDD lajstromú DC-8-asa

Tíz perccel később egy másik gép is leszáll ugyanitt: a Swissair 100-as számú járata Zürichből tartott volna New Yorkba, mikor a kora délutáni órákban eltérítették. A DC-8-as fedélzetén a géprablás idején 145 utas és nyolcfőnyi személyzet tartózkodik.

Szept. 7-én a géprablók rögtönzött sajtótájékoztatót tartanak a kitörőfélben lévő jordániai polgárháború okán a térségben tartózkodó újságírók és tévések számára. Kinyilatkoztatják, hogy a géprablások célja, hogy felhívják a világ figyelmét a palesztinok helyzetére, ill. hogy nyomást gyakoroljanak Izraelre (és rajta keresztül az őt támogató Amerikai Egyesült Államokra), és elérjék az érintett nemzetek (Izrael, Svájc, Nagy-Britannia, NSZK) börtöneiben fogvatartott palesztin "politikai foglyok" ill. az egy nappal korábban Londonban letartóztatott Khaled szabadon bocsátását. Ha követeléseiket nem teljesítík 72 órán belül, a gépeket az utasokkal együtt a levegőbe repítik - szól az ultimátum.

Mára lassan nyomtalanul eltűnik a hajdani "repülőtér"...

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A két gépről összesen több mint 300 embert tartanak fogva a terroristák. A palesztinok az egyre előrenyomuló jordániai fegyveresekkel megállapodnak, hogy szabadon engednek 127 túszt, ha azok cserébe hátrébb vonják csapataikat. A túszokat a palesztinok által elfoglalt Ammánba viszik, és egy szállodában "helyezik el". Azt azonban el nem hagyhatják, útleveleik ugyanis fogva tartóiknál vannak. Ezzel párhuzamosan, egy esetleges izraeli beavatkozástól tartva, a gépekről egy maroknyi túszt, köztük amerikai kormányzati munkatársakat ill. két rabbit, egy Ammántól mintegy 150km-re lévő titkos helyre visznek a fegyveresek.

A BOAC G-ASGN lajstromú VC-10-ese

Eközben szept. 9-én a BOAC 775-ös, Bombayból Bahreinen keresztül Londonba tartó járatát palesztin szimpatizánsok kerítik hatalmukba, melyet nem sokkal a Bahreinből való felszállást követően először Bejrútba, majd onnan Dawson's Fieldre térítenek. Ezzel újabb 105 utassal és kilencfőnyi személyzettel növekszik az ammáni szállóban fogva tartott túszok száma.

A váratlan esemény hírére a palesztinok az eredetileg kitűzött határidőt szept. 13-ra módosítják.

A BOAC gépe már lángokban...

Egy nappal a határidő lejárta előtt, a palesztinok kb. félszáz ember kivételével elengedik a túszokat a három gépről, majd, elszántságukat demonstrálandó, felrobbantják a kiürített gépeket.

Szept. 30-án a terroristák elengedik a különböző helyszíneken fogvatartott túszaikat, miután Khaledet és féltucatnyi Európában bebörtönzött palesztint szabadon engednek. A túszokat a Vöröskereszt segítségével Ammánból Ciprusra, majd onnét Rómába menekítik. A géprablók szabadon távozhatnak...

Nixon amerikai elnök eközben a túszdráma hírére már szeptember közepén útjára indít egy programot a légikalózkodás megfékezésére: kezdésként elrendeli egy 100 szövetségi ügynökből álló csoport felállítását, melynek tagjai fegyveres légimarshallként ezentúl amerikai repülőjáratokon fognak szolgálni. Elrendeli továbbá, hogy a Védelmi ill. a Közlekedési Minisztérium vizsgálja meg annak kérdését, lehetséges-e civil célra használni a katonai célra már alkalmazott röntgengépeket.

Még ugyanebben az évben nemzetközi egyezmény születik a légi kalózkodás elleni fellépés ügyében, a résztvevő országok pedig elkezdik összehangolni biztonsági óvintézkedéseiket, ill. megszigorítani a vonatkozó büntetőjogi szankciókat. 1972. végére a Szövetségi Légügyi Hivatal minden amerikai légitársaság számára kötelezővé teszi az utasok és poggyászok átvilágítását, ill. azt a szabályt, hogy poggyász utas nélkül nem utazhat.

Elsőként a BOAC VC-10-esét (G-ASGN) robbantják fel a géprablók..

[Grasshoppair presents...] Mennyen innen, mennyen túl

A barokkos felhőkön túl Varsó reptere várt bennünket.. :)

4U 753 - smoke in cockpit, both pilots nearly incapacitated

Dec 20th 2010

A Germanwings Airbus A319-100, registration D-AGWK performing flight 4U-753 from Vienna (Austria) to Cologne (Germany) with 144 passengers and 5 crew, was on approach to Cologne when the crew reported smoke in the cockpit. The airplane continued for a safe landing. Paramedics needed to treat both flight crew at the airport and subsequently took them to a hospital. The cause of the smoke is unknown.


Sep 27th 2012

The German BFU released their preliminary report in German stating, that both flight crew became partially incapacitated within seconds following a strong burning electrical smell on base leg and during intercept of the localizer. The captain's oxygen level in his blood fell substantially below 80%, the first officer's oxygen level below 80% (normal value 95-98%). The first officer was in sick leave for 6 months following the event.

The flight had been delayed due to heavy snowfall in Cologne. The aircraft finally departed Vienna with a delay of 3 hours, the flight was uneventful until the aircraft turned onto the left base leg for Cologne's runway 14L when both flight crew smelled a strong electrical burning odour. Upon query the purser reported no smell in the cabin. The odour seemed to subside after a brief moment.

While the aircraft turned to intercept the localizer the first officer reported he felt seriously sick close to vomiting (German "kotzübel"), he smelled a strong electrical sweet odour and would don his oxygen mask. Alerted by that remark the captain noticed his legs and arms were tickling, his senses were literally vanishing and his sight abruptly reduced to a tunnel view. He too donned his oxygen mask. The first officer needed two attempts to don his oxygen masks. After both flight crew had donned their oxygen masks, the captain improved slightly, while the first officer's condition continued to deteriorate.

The captain (35, ATPL, 7,864 hours total, 3,107 on type) instructed the first officer (26, CPL, 720 hours total, 472 hours on type) to advise approach they would immediately contact tower and to declare Mayday on tower. While the first officer was communicating with tower declaring emergency and reporting strong smell in the cockpit the tower instructed an aircraft ahead of the A319 to go around, the aircraft established on the glide path, the captain, pilot flying, selected flaps 1 himself and disengaged the autopilot now flying manually. The aircraft was flying too fast (around 220 KIAS), the captain therefore deployed spoilers, instructed the first officer therefore to lower the gear and later to select flaps 2.

At that point the first officer felt overwhelmed, he could no longer overview the scenario, could no longer process the arriving information and had difficulty to focus on single aspects of the scenario. The captain felt that while manually flying the aircraft he was at the upper limit of what he was capable to do in his bad bodily shape.

After the crew managed to configure the aircraft for landing, the aircraft was still too fast, the captain decided that a go-around was not possible and thus cancelled the stability criteria (gate at 1000 feet), their only option was to put the aircraft down as quickly as possible.

The first officer described the time between 1800 feet and touchdown as an eternity, he was however able to recognize that the aircraft had reached and was maintaining correct approach speed and realized they had not worked the landing checklist. He thus processed the landing checklist which required all his efforts, it was difficult to process the checklist, it was difficult to concentrate and think.

Both pilots reported that just prior to landing they perceived their situation as surreal and like in a dream.

The aircraft touched down on the runway, the automatic brakes slowed the aircraft to about 40 knots, the captain subsequently applied manual brakes, the aircraft began to skid, the captain however managed to slow the aircraft to taxi speed and vacate the runway via taxiway A3. He then joined taxiway A and handed controls to the first officer to be able to talk to emergency services. The first officer totally focussed on steering the aircraft that he did not get anything that happened around him.

The captain in the meantime was talking to emergency services, tower did not want them taxi to the gate but to a remote stand away from the buildings, following that decision the captain took over again and taxied the aircraft to the stand. Shortly before arriving on stand the first officer noticed they had not yet run the after landing checklist, the checklist was now executed. After reaching the stand and applying park brake both crew realised the APU had not yet been started, the APU was started.

The first officer wanted to open his side window, but needed three attempts to do so. After the window was open he removed his oxygen masks, but immediately noticed the acrid smell again and donned his oxygen mask again.

Emergency services subsequently entered the cockpit, the first officer needed assistance to get off the aircraft, while the captain remained in the cockpit until all passengers had disembarked. Emergency services measured oxygen levels in the blood of both pilots and found the captain substantially below 80% (at about 70%) and the first officer below 80%, paramedics commented both pilots were close to faint.

The BFU stated the events in the cockpit remained unnoticed in the cabin until after landing.

Following landing the aircraft was checked by airline maintenance who identified de-icing fluid as source of the smell. The technicians reported that they could clearly detect the odour even 15 minutes after landing. Maintenance replaced cooling fans for cockpit instrumentation, no pollution was detected. The engines were checked, washed and ground run with no findings, the flight crew oxygen supply and masks replaced, and a 45 minutes test flight undertaken with no odours, the aircraft was thus returned to service on Dec 20th 2010.

A C-Check 13 months later also did not identify any possible causes of the smell.

The BFU reported that their initial information received from emergency services had been smoke in the cockpit, both pilots were treated in ambulances, it was suspected they were suffering from smoke poisoning. Subsequently the airline told the BFU, that there had been no smoke but only smell, maintenance had identified de-icing fluid as cause of the smell, the crew had been released from hospital, the crew did not suffer from any poisoning. Following that information the BFU decided to not open an investigation.

Only a year later the BFU received additional information which prompted the BFU to open an investigation.

The BFU reported that medical services at the airport already measured the blood oxygen levels of both pilots and found the values below and well below 80%. Both pilots were subsequently taken to a hospital for further diagnosis. During the drive to the hospital one pilot recovered to the point where he commented he could clearly think again. After two hours in the hospital both pilots were discharged without blood analysis.

The first officer went to the hospital again the following day for a detailed analysis of his health condition. A blood analysis detected two conspicuous values in the area of clinical chemistry, the first officer was not fit for duty for 6 months.

The BFU did not release any safety recommendations so far.

In a similiar event involving the very same Germanwings A319 the Irish AAIU concluded "The probable cause of the adverse symptoms reported by the aircraft crew and some passengers could not be determined", see Accident: Germanwings A319 at Dublin on May 27th 2008, pressurization problems.


Dec 5th 2013

The German BFU released their final report concluding the probable cause of the accident was:

The health impairments of both pilots combined with a significant limitation of the capability to perform which had occurred during the approach were very likely caused by:

- Massive development of smell in the cockpit area whose origin and spread could not be determined.

Contributing factors could have been:

- Physiological and psychological effects of the smell on both crew members

The BFU added, that no smell was noticed in the cabin.

The BFU therefore analysed that scenarios like oil leakage in engines, APU or hydraulic systems, cockpit contamination by TCP, supply of contaminated air from the outside, contamination with insecticides, de-icing fluid, use of dry-ice, carbon-monoxide, rain repellent or some sort of disease were unlikely, stating that scenario involving toxic substances like tricresylphosphate and its isomers, n-phenyl-l-naphthylamine and carbon-monoxide had been looked into, however, with respect to TCP's ortho isomer which might have caused symptoms similiar to those experienced the BFU stated: "That the TCP ortho-isomer was present during the approach to Köln/Bonn on 19 December 2010 could not be proven".

The BFU stated however:

"The BFU does not entirely rule out the following scenario:

- Smell development due to malfunctioning electrical or electronical systems on board"

and stated: "Such a contamination of the air in the cockpit or a local smell development due to an electrical malfunction could not entirely be ruled out. The BFU has knowledge of cases in which e.g. a tantalum capacitor developed an intense smell. It was a temporarily extremely unpleasant smell which forced the crew to don their oxygen masks. Determination of the cause was difficult because often these tantalum capacitors only serve as buffer amplifiers in electrical gadgets. Even if a component were defective the electronic system would still be fully functional and it would be very difficult to identify the "burnt" tantalum capacitor."

The BFU reported that the captain (35, ATPL, 8,535 hours total, 7,864 hours on type) recovered and was fit to fly after 4 days, the first officer (26, CPL, 720 hours total, 472 hours on type) needed 6 months to recover and become fit to fly again.

The BFU complained: "For the BFU it was unusual that about one year later the severity of the occurrence came to light because of new information the BFU received" stating a BFU representative had been at the aircraft 25 minutes after the aircraft landed and had talked to the captain, the captain identified as having been impaired or partially impaired indicating that he had difficulties controlling the aircraft. The first officer, who was already in the ambulance, was not interviewed, the representative not identifying it necessary as treatment in the ambulance, e.g. to prepare blood samples, was not unusual. As result the investigation was based only on QAR data and the interviews with the crew, however, did not have cockpit voice or flight data recordings available. The BFU summarised: "Due to an error in communication within the BFU the seriousness of the occurrence had not become clear."

The BFU analysed that the QAR data did not identify any anomaly in flight and flight profile except that the speed was too high during intercept of the glideslope, which however was noticed and the captain made several inputs to correct. The aircraft and flight trajectory met the criteria of a stabilized approach. The approach thus was stable and safe, the aircraft touched down in the required landing configuration and in the touch down zone of the runway.

The BFU analysed with respect to human performance: "The only source of information the BFU had, were the QAR data and the descriptions the two pilots had given, because neither CVR data, nor video recordings, nor witness reports were available. The pilots have assessed the severity of their physiological and psychological limitations with the help of a description and decision-making aid. The classification the PIC made of "Impairment" to "Partial Impairment" showed that he could perform his tasks with some, partially even great difficulties and that he made some minor errors. One example was that the landing checklist was completed after the pilot monitoring had reminded them to do so. The co-pilot described the impairment of his performance capabilities as "Partial Incapacitation" which means he could carry out his tasks with great difficulties only. In summary, the BFU has come to the conclusion that neither of the two pilots suffered "full" incapacitation. However, both were significantly impaired in their capacity to perform. The co-pilot was more gravely affected than the PIC. This assessment was confirmed by the analysis of the course of the flight between the beginning of the occurrence and the parking of the airplane at the parking position. In spite of severe limitations the crew was able to bring the flight to an end in a controlled fashion."

With respect to use of resources and response to the fumes and recognition of impairment the BFU analysed: "The decision of the PIC to conduct the approach and landing manually instead of automated was noteworthy. In general, the automated conduct of flight is supposed to be a relief for flight crews which should also be true for abnormal situations. The BFU is of the opinion that an autoland would have posed risks because the required operating conditions for the instrument landing system on the ground could not be guaranteed in the short time available." and concluded: "The BFU does not question the pilot's decision to fly and land manually after the occurrence had happened. The justification that the situation had scared him, and he then rejected the thought to conduct an autoland pretty fast, because he would have had to consider too many things, was understandable. When the BFU reviewed the course of action, the argument and the sense of the PIC that due to his long-term experience the control of the airplane would occur "automatisiert" (automated) were taken into consideration. The fact that approach and landing were stabilised and safe shows that the PIC had estimated his options in this situation correctly."


Source:
http://avherald.com/h?article=434e753b/0019&opt=0   

[Kiarakat] Olympic Air A319

Alighanem az SX-OAF lajstromjelű A319-100-as lehet az Olympic Air...

utolsó, még forgalomban lévő Airbusa, ugyanis 2010 nyarától kezdve, ...

csupán egy évvel az Olympic Airways megszűnését ill. az új társaság, ...

az Olympic Air létrejöttét követően, elkezdtek továbbadni a flottában lévő...

7db 319-es ill. 9db A320-as gépeken. Valószínűleg ennek a folyamatnak...

lesz az utolsó áldozata az -OAF, melyet 2008-ban gyártottak, és első évét...

a Hamburg Airways kötelékében töltötte.

A spotter-oldalak fotói alapján az elmúlt években megfordult Milánóban, ...

Larnacán, Londonban, Rodoszon, Belgrádban, Korfun, Krétán, ...

Isztambulban, Szamoson és Tel-Avivban is.